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REPORT FROM THE FRONT LINE: THE
BENNETT PLAN, STREET-LEVEL DRUG

ENFORCEMENT IN NEW YORK CITY AND
THE LEGALIZATION DEBATE
Michael Z. Letwin*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In September, 1989, the Bush administration presented its National Drug Control Strategy-popularly known as the "Bennett
Plan."' The Plan vociferously rejected drug legalization 2 and, like
every other federal drug war program since the Nixon administration, devoted seventy percent of the Plan's proposed resources to law
enforcement,3 including federal prosecutors, courts, and prisons.4
The Plan identified the typical cocaine user as a white male
high school graduate living in a small city or suburb. 5 Nonetheless,
based on figures that purportedly show a decline in suburban hard
drug use,6 the domestic portion of the plan stressed an increase in
* President, The Association of Legal Aid Attorneys; Staff Attorney, The New York City
Legal Aid Society Criminal Defense Division, 1985-1990. B.A. University of Massachusetts,
1981; J.D. Rutgers/Newark School of Law, 1985. The views expressed here, however, do not
necessarily reflect those of the above-cited organizations. I owe a debt of gratitude to the many
people who helped me to develop and refine this Article, above all the members of my family.
1. OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POL'Y, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

(1989) [hereinafter

BENNETT PLAN I]; see also OFFICE OF THE NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POL'Y,
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY (1990) [hereinafter BENNETT PLAN II].
2. BENNETT PLAN I, supra note 1, at 6-7.

3. Weinraub, President Offers Strategy for U.S. on Drug Control, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6,
1989, at Al, col. 6.

4.

BENNETT PLAN

I,supra note 1,at 117-18.

5. See id. at 4.
6. Id. at 1, 4; see also CasualDrug Use Is Sharply Down, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1989, at
A14, col. 1 (citing the 1988 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse). There is evidence,
however, that hard drug use, including crack, is very widespread in the suburban white middle
class. See, e.g., Malcolm, Affluent Addicts' Road Back Begins in a Climb Past Denial, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 2, 1989, at Al, col. 4 (indicating that affluent addicts are more likely to deny their
addiction and better able to hide its devastating effects); Massing, Crack's Destructive Sprint
Across America, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1989, § 6 (Magazine), at 38 (discussing the prevalence
of crack addiction throughout the country); Malcolm, Crack, Bane of Inner City Is Now Grip-
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street-level narcotics enforcement directed at the inner-city crack
crisis.7 Such programs, argued the Plan, would effectively address
that crisis:
when neighborhood police increase the number of drug arrests in
an area, when they put pressure on local drug transactions through
surveillance and undercover work, and when they force dealers to
take refuge in less conspicuous places, the drug markets that menace neighborhoods cease to flourish. At the very least, young people
and new users are denied easy access to drugs.8

The Plan's January 1990 supplement declared that "street level
enforcement techniques

. . .

have already shown success in so many

neighborhoods" 9 and therefore handed up a "stunning rebuke to the
cynics and defeatists" of the drug wars.10
Politicians of both parties have criticized the Plan on a variety
of grounds, but have not challenged the need for, or the importance
of, narcotics enforcement.11 Similarly, while skeptical of the Plan,
ping Suburbs, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1989, at 1, col. 1 (noting crack's emergence in middle and
upper-class circles); Blumenthal, For Child of Detectives, Torment Over Drugs, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 19, 1989, at Al, col. 2 (indicating that even the daughter of a New York City under-

cover narcotics detective is not immune from the scourge of drugs); Gergen, Drugs and White
America, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 18, 1989, at 79 (stating that although middle

class drug use seems to be declining "it is still estimated that 76 percent of those who use
illegal drugs are white.").
Compare NATIONAL INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 1988 NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE (1989) [hereinaf-

ter NIDA HIGHLIGHTS] (finding that between 1985 and 1988 current drug use declined significantly among men and women, and for blacks, whites and Hispanics) with Fitzgerald, Dispatches from the Drug Wars, COMMON CAUSE, Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 13 (noting that out of
400,000 frequent users of illegal drugs in New York, whites composed two-thirds of this
group).
7. Although the use and sale of illegal substances involves a wide range of drugs, including heroin and cocaine, the current crisis has coincided above all with the arrival of crack
cocaine from the mid-1980s to the present. It is widely perceived that the crisis has brought a
dramatic increase in inner-city crime, violence, intra-family abuse and disease. Crack is a cocaine derivative that is smoked rather than ingested through the nose. See Reinerman & Levine, The Crack Attack: Politics and Media in America's Latest Drug Scare, in IMAGES OF
ISSUES; TYPIFYING CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS 116-17 (J. Best ed. 1989).
8. BENNETT PLAN I, supra note 1,at 21.
9. BENNETT PLAN II, supra note 1, at 14.

10. Id. at 4.
11. In the wake of the Bush speech, it was quickly noted that, despite its advertised
increase, the Plan's budget increased real spending for the drug wars in the next fiscal year by
only $716 million. Weinraub, supra note 3, at 1, col. 6. According to Sen. Joseph P. Biden (DDel.), the Democratic spokesperson on drug policy, this meant that "the president's plan [did]
not include enough police officers to catch the violent thugs, enough prosecutors to convict
them, enough judges to sentence them or enough prison cells to put them away for a long
time." Sirica, Bush Targets CasualUsers, Sets Billions Against Drugs, N.Y. Newsday, Sept.
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many representatives of urban communities most directly affected by
the crack crisis12 have supported drug enforcement generally and inner-city street-level narcotics programs in particular. 3
The purpose of this Article is to focus on the urban drug war
which, consistent with the Bennett Plan's approach, is being conducted in New York City, where the crack crisis is arguably most
advanced, and local law enforcement efforts most ambitious. 4 Sec6, 1989, at 5, col. 4, 27, col. 4.
12. Both Congressman Charles Rangel of Harlem, who chairs the House Committee on
Narcotics Abuse and Control, and 1988 Presidential Candidate Reverend Jesse Jackson
faulted the Bennett Plan for downplaying enforcement strategies directed at the "supply-side"
of drug trafficking-such as crop eradication abroad, border interdiction, and the prosecution
of money laundering by the financial sector-and for failing to fund prevention and treatment
on demand, or to address the underlying social conditions in the inner-cities which they identify as the reasons for abuse and trafficking. See Legalization of Illicit Drugs, Part I, Hearing
Before the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, House of Representatives,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3, 131-39 (1988) [hereinafter Legalization Hearings, Part 1] (statement of Charles B. Rangel, Chairman); Jackson, A Real War On Drugs Can't Ignore Poverty,
N.Y. Newsday, Sept. 18, 1989, at 58, col. 1; see also Johnston, Bush's Drug Strategy Is
Criticized As Failingto Seek Views of Cities, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1989, at 8, col. 1.
13. Congressman Rangel ridiculed the Plan as "a thousand points of light without batteries," Waldman, Money Worries Mute Plan's Praise, N.Y. Newsday, Sept. 6, 1989, at 13,
col. 1. Congressman Charles Schumer said the plan was "not enough for [street-level enforcement on] three street corners in New York." Sisk, Experts Back Bush on Drugs, Daily News,
Sept. 3, 1989, at 13, col. 2, col. 4. Rev. Jackson said that the Plan was "just another skirmish;
it's not a full-scale war .... " Page, Newest General Joins Old Fray, N.Y. Newsday, Sept. 6,
1989, at 5, col. 3, 26, col. 3.
Others in the African-American community have called for more extreme measures, such
as the mobilization of the national guard. See McQueen, Owens: B'klyn Needs the Guard,
N.Y. Newsday, Oct. 22, 1989, at 3, col. I (referring to Brooklyn Democratic State Congressional Representative Major Owens); Raspberry, A Capital Callfor Troops, Daily News, Feb.
21, 1989, at 25, col. 1 (referring to psychiatrist Frances Cress Welsing and the District of
Columbia); Herbert, Drug War: Long on Lip, Short on Fight, Daily News, Oct. 23, 1988, at
2, col. 1. (urgings by columnist Bob Herbert). Others have suggested the imposition of martial
law and the public execution of street-level drug dealers. See, e.g., Benjamin, Down With
Crack, Village Voice, Sept. 19, 1989, at 29, col. 2.
14. The source material used in this Article includes police and other data, anecdotal
accounts from a variety of sources and the experience of attorneys who have represented clients charged with drug offenses. For an overview of the scholarly discussion of street-level
narcotics enforcement, not fully surveyed here, see, for example, S.T. HILLSMAN, S. SADD, M.L.
SULLIVAN

& M. SVIRIDOFF. THE COMMUNITY EFFECTS OF STREET LEVEL NARCOTICS EN-

A STUDY OF THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S TACTICAL NARCOTICS
1-14 (Vera Inst. of Just. 1989) (addressing a focal question of what effect street level
drug enforcement will have) [hereinafter VERA INST. REPORT]; NATIONAL INST. OF JUST.. U.S.
FORCEMENT:
TEAMS

DEP'T OF JUST., ISSUES AND PRACTICES, STREET-LEVEL DRUG ENFORCEMENT: EXAMINING THE
ISSUES (M. Chaiken ed. 1988) (examining the extent to which the TNT effort can reduce
disorderly conditions and effectuate other desired outcomes) [hereinafter STREET-LEVEL DRUG

ENFORCEMENT]; L. ZIMMER, OPERATION PRESSURE POINT: THE DISRUPTION OF STREET-LEVEL
DRUG TRADE ON NEW YORK'S LOWER EAST SIDE (Occasional Papers from The Center For

Research in Crime and Justice, New York Univ. School of Law 1987) (analyzing the efforts of
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tion II argues that the two largest anti-drug efforts, Operation Pressure Point I and the Tactical Narcotics Teams (TNT), have failed to
stem the crisis.15 Section III puts this failure in the context of the
interaction between drug prohibition and oppressive social conditions
in New York's inner-city, particularly in the African-American communities.' 6 Section IV discusses some of the related toll of the war
on drugs on these communities." Section V draws on, and in some
ways goes beyond, views previously developed by drug war critics,'"
to argue that the New York City experience illustrates the need for
drug legalization, unprecedented programs to combat drug abuse,
and-above all-a fundamental transformation in the overall condition of the inner-cities.' 9
II. NEW

YORK STREET-LEVEL NARCOTICS OPERATIONS

In recent years, the New York City Police Department
(NYPD) has operated a variety of programs to deal with narcotics
in particular geographic areas throughout the city. Operation Pressure Point I (OPP-I), a mid-1980s response to the widespread supply
of heroin in Manhattan's Lower East Side, and the Tactical Narcotics Teams (TNT), a late-1980s citywide attempt to address the
crack problem, have been two of the most significant of these

programs.2 0
the New York City Police Department to curtail blatant street-level drug trafficking).
15. See infra notes 20-84 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 85-128 and accompanying text. A more complete analysis would, of
course, include equal attention to other sections of New York City, particularly the Latino
community.
17. See infra notes 129-65 and accompanying text.
18. For an in-depth discussion of all aspects of the legalization debate, see generally
Legalization of Illicit Drugs, PartsI and II, HearingBefore the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and control, House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) [hereinafter
Legalization Hearings, Part(s)I and/or II]; THE DRUG POLICY FOUND., DRUG POLICY 19891990 A REFORMER'S CATALOGUE (A. Trebach & K. Zeese eds. 1989); S. WISOTSKY, BREAKING THE IMPASSE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS (1986); Nadelmann, Drug Prohibitionin the United
States: Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives, 245 Scl. 939 (1989); DEALING WITH DRUGS
(R. Hamowy ed. 1987).
19. See infra notes 166-75 and accompanying text.
20. Other programs have included Operation Pressure Point II in Central Harlem; Operation Pressure Point III in the area around 14th Street and Union Square Park in Manhattan; the Special Narcotics Abatement Program (SNAP); Bronx Anti-Narcotics Drive
(BAND); Operation Clean Heights (Washington Heights, Manhattan); the Anti-Crack Unit;
Operation 107th Street (Manhattan); Operation Q.U.E.E.N.S.; Operation Clean Up I and II;
and the Park Programs. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT. ANALYSIS. & PLANNING OF NY CITY,
FIGHTING DRUG ABUSE (1988).
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A.

Operation Pressure Point I

In 1984, amidst much fanfare, the NYPD launched Operation
Pressure Point I (OPP-I) in Manhattan's Lower East Side, then considered "the most open heroin market in the nation. ' 21 Before the
program began, the Lower East Side was a mixed, largely minority
community, characterized by dilapidated housing and run-down
commercial buildings 22 where rapid "gentrification" 2 resulted in political pressure on the police to disrupt street-level drug traffic.2 4 In

this context, Benjamin Ward, the first African-American New York
Police Commissioner, then newly appointed, devised OPP-I to serve
as "a highly visible and newsworthy project with which to begin his
administration."2 5 Large numbers of rookie uniformed NYPD officers on foot dispersed crowds, made searches and arrests, and questioned those perceived to be buyers or sellers. 26 Housing Authority
and Transit Authority police intensified patrols in the housing
projects and subways. 27 Plainclothes officers from the Narcotics Division carried out surveillance and "buy and bust" operations. 28
The Bennett Plan asserts that OPP-I "demonstrated how an
area virtually overrun by drug traffic and use could be reclaimed by
' Indeed, by its
a persistent and well-coordinated police effort." 29
2000th day in September 1989 the operation had resulted in 46,903
21. See L. Zimmer, supra note 14, at 1.
22. Id. at 2-4. This neighborhood's composition "provid[ed] an ideal location for expansion of a drug trade that had been there a long time." Id. at 2.
23. Gentrification refers to a process in which middle class and wealthy buyers take
advantage of the low cost of housing and commercial rent in poor neighborhoods to move in,
displace existing African-American, Latino, white and other residents, and transform the area
into a predominantly white and middle to upper middle class community. See Smith & LeFaivre, A Class Analysis of Gentrification, in GENTRIFICATION. DISPLACEMENT AND NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION 49 (1984).
24. See L. ZIMMER, supra note 14, at 4.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 4-6. In addition to the 25,976 members of the regular New York Police Department (NYPD), New York City has two other police departments, the 2,032-member
Housing Authority Police Department (HAPD), which focuses on public housing projects and
the 3,916-member Transit Authority Police Department (TAPD), which operates primarily in
the extensive subway system. All three departments have the same city-wide arrest powers.
See NEW YORK STATE Div. OF CRIM. JUST. SERVS., GOVERNOR'S ANTI-CRIME ACTION
AGENDA: A MONITORING REPORT ON THE NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 27,

29 (July 1989) [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S JULY ACTION AGENDA].
28. See L. ZIMMER, supra note 14, at 6; infra note 137 (discussing "buy and bust"
operations).
29. BENNETT PLAN I, supra note 1, at 22.
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arrests, 36,102 of them for narcotics offenses. 30 White, middle class
community organizations took control of areas "liberated" by the police from drug traffic.8 ' Drug transactions in the target areas became
less noticeable, and the operation coincided with a decrease in many
drug-related property crimes. 2 These accomplishments, in turn, further increased the rate of gentrification. 33
In fact, however, OPP-1 has not been the success claimed by its
supporters. From the earliest days, drug traffickers adapted themselves to the program by shortening the duration and increasing the
size of transactions, altering their time and location, and by utilizing
more lookouts and other personnel. Those dealers who were arrested
and prosecuted were quickly replaced by others.3 4 Thus, a few
months after the program began, residents were left with the impression that "the drug market is seething, just under the surface, ready
to explode if the police break the stalemate by withdrawing from the
Lower East Side,"' 5 an eventuality that the NYPD has forestalled
by continuing the operation for over five years.
Despite this huge effort, by August 1989, the police admitted in
internal documents that "[d]rug activity [in the OPP-1 zone] for the
most part continues to be covert and occurring indoors" particularly
in "numerous grocery stores". 36 Moreover, any decline in drug trafficking and crime in the target area was due largely to displacement
to poorer parts of the neighborhood 37 and into adjacent or more distant neighborhoods, possibly as far away as Harlem." As one commentator concluded "Pressure Point I . . . clearly improved local
conditions, but its effects elsewhere ... in terms of displacing drug
use and crime . . . [are] open to question."39 Perhaps most impor30. Memo from Chief of Department to Police Commissioner, Sept. 27, 1989, at 1, in
Quality of Life and Narcotics Enforcement Programs 1989 (BM292) (NYPD Aug. 1989)
[hereinafter Programs 1989].

31.

Id. at 6-8.

32.

Id.; see also L. ZIMMER, supra note 14, at 11-12 (reporting the decrease of drug-

related property crimes of robbery and burglary during OPP-I from 1983 to 1984).
33.
34.

L. ZIMMER, supra note 14, at 13.
It has been observed that "[s]treet-level dealers are a fluid group, made up of drug

users who sell to support their own use and local adolescents, anxious to earn money." Id. at 9.
35. Id. at 16.
36. Memo of Sept. 5, 1989 from Project Director OPP I to Commanding Officer, PBMS
(PBMS #0010-08), in Project 1989. (Hofstra Law Review was unable to obtain this source to

verify the accuracy of the cited language).
37.

L. ZIMMiER, supra note 14, at 13-14.

38. Id. at 8-9.
39. Kleiman, Crackdowns: The Effects Of Intensive Enforcement on Retail Heroin
Dealing in STREET-LEVEL DRuG, ENFORCEMENT, supra note 14, at 16. Such displacement can
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tant, there is no indication that overall availability or drug consumption has declined.4" Therefore, despite OPP-1, the "value [of streetlevel heroin operations] ... as crime control in big cities is
41
to be shown.

B.

...

still

The Tactical Narcotics Team (TNT) Program

In February 1988, Police Officer Edward Byrne was shot and
killed while he guarded the Queens home of a witness in a highly
publicized drug prosecution.42 In the wake of Byrne's death, thenMayor Edward Koch and Police Commissioner Benjamin Ward announced the creation of the NYPD Tactical Narcotics Teams
(TNT), and The City Anti-Drug Task Force, a network of 23 city
agencies 43 to "win this battle against drugs. '44 The operation was
further escalated following the death of officers Michael Buczek and
Christopher Hoban, who were killed in separate narcotics operations
on the evening of October 18, 1988.11
occur as a result of at least two dynamics. To some degree, when police push drug traffic out of
a neighborhood at least some dealers are displaced elsewhere, which in turn pushes interdealer violence into the turf of rival organizations. See T. WILLIAMS, THE COCAINE KIDS
(1989); P. Goldstein, H. Brownstein, P. Ryan & P.A. Bellucci, Crack and Homicide in New
York City, 1988: A Conceptually-Based Event Analysis, 16 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 651
(1989) [hereinafter Goldstein]. In addition, even where there is not a large scale movement of
sellers from one neighborhood to another, other dealers in adjacent or nearby areas pick up the
slack by increasing their sales.
40. Bouza, Evaluating Street-Level Drug Enforcement, in STREET-LEVEL DRUG ENFORCEMENT, supra note 14, at 44 (surveying the good and bad effects of street-level
enforcement).
41. Kleiman, supra note 39, at 29 (noting a lack of clear evidence on OPP-I's success in
displacing drug trafficking and related crimes).
42. See Fried, Officer Guarding Drug Witness Is Slain, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1988, at
Al, col. 1.
43. See 3 THE TACTICAL NARCOTICS TEAM & THE ANTI-DRUG TASK FORCE, 90 DAY
INTERIM REPORT To THE MAYOR 1 (July 1989) [hereinafter TNT III]; see also James, 113
Officers to Fight Drugs at Queens Site, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1988, at Bi, col. 5 (announcing
the creation of TNT as a result of Officer Byrne's death and noting the assistance of the fire
and building departments, politicians, and the United States Attorneys offices from both
Brooklyn and Manhattan)
TNT works in conjunction with the City Anti-Drug Task Force "[iln order to eliminate
quality of life conditions in the target area that foster drug trafficking and use ....
TNT III,
supra, at 1. TNT also works closely with the Drug Enforcement Task Force, staffed by the
NYPD, Drug Enforcement Agency, New York State Police and the Joint Organized Crime
Narcotics Task Force, staffed by the NYPD and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Id.
44. Letter from Benjamin Ward, Police Commissioner and James H. Harding, Jr., Special Advisor to the Mayor, to Hon. Edward I. Koch, Mayor (Nov. 1, 1988) reprinted in
MAYOR'S SOUTHEAST QUEENS ANTI-DRUG TASK FORCE COMMUNITY COALITION, 90 DAY INTERIM REPORT ii (Oct. 1988) [hereinafter TNT I].
45. See Pitt, Tragic Night: Detectives Look Back, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1988, at BI,
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TNT differs from OPP-I in a number of ways. First, it is part of
the largest local narcotics program ever established. In fiscal year
1989, New York City spent almost a billion dollars on drug related
enforcement,46 and from 1988 to 1990 spent $116 million on TNT 47
which, according to Ward, represented a commitment of "more resources to the war on drugs than any other municipality in the country."148 By the end of 1989, 2,100 officers were expected to be assigned to narcotics enforcement, 725 of them in TNT, 4 a drug war
army second only to the federal Drug Enforcement Agency's 2,800
agents. 50 Second, it is based primarily in predominantly AfricanAmerican and Latino poor and working class neighborhoods.'> And
col.
2.
46. See A City Deluged, N.Y. Newsday, Dec. 17, 1989, at 14, col. 1, 15, col. 2 (estimating drug-law enforcement expenditures in New York City for fiscal 1989 to be $942.7 million
dollars including costs of police, corrections, probation, legal aid, court appointed attorneys,
borough district attorneys and special prosecutors).
47. Frankel & Freeland, Is Street-Level Enforcement a Bust?, AM. LAW., Mar. 1990, at
100, 102.
48. Marriot, New York's Worst Drug Sites: PersistentMarkets of Death, N.Y. Times,
June 1, 1989, at Al, col. 5., B4, col. 4. [hereinafter Marriot, Markets of Death].
49. Frankel & Freeland, supra note 47, at 102.
50. Esposito, Fewer Officers Will Walk the Beat, N.Y. Newsday, Feb. 16, 1989, at 27,
col. 2 (reporting that despite the New York City's financial "crunch" the narcotics division
would continue to be increased).
51. The following are portraits of typical TNT neighborhoods:
Manhattan North TNT Target Area 2 (February15 - May 14, 1989): This section
of northwest Harlem is a densely populated neighborhood of multiple dwellings and
vacant buildings made up of two community districts, Districts 9 and 10. District 9
is 48.6 percent Black, 22.9 percent White and 22.7 percent Hispanic. District 10 is
91.6 percent Black, 6.5 percent Hispanic, 1.3 percent "Other" and 0.6 percent
white. In District 9 the median household income is $13,500, which is approximately 33 percent lower than the city average, and in District 10, the median household income is $8,600, 60 percent below the average.
TNT III, supra note 43, at 12-13.
Manhattan North Target Area I (November 14, 1988 - February 14, 1989): This
section of East Harlem is also a densely populated neighborhood of tenements and
walkup apartment buildings. The population is 43.8 percent Black, 42.4 percent
Hispanic, and 10.7 White. The median household income is $8,300, less than half of
the city median of $20,000.
2 THE TACTICAL NARCOTICS TEAM & THE ANTI-DRUG TASK FORCE, 90 DAY INTERIM REPORT To THE MAYOR 41-42 (Apr. 1989) [hereinafter TNT Il].
Brooklyn North TNT Target Area I (January 2 - May 2. 1989): This East New
York neighborhood of one and two-family homes and apartment buildings is densely
populated, and includes a number of large housing projects. The population is 42.7
percent Black, 29.1 percent Hispanic, 19.8 percent white, and 8.4 percent "Other".
In this target area, the median household income is $ 13,500, 33 percent below the
city average.
TNT 1Il, supra note 43, at 5.
Bronx TNT Target Area 1 (February15 - May 21, 1989): The South Bronx-Hunts
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third, TNT strategy is to saturate drug-infested neighborhoods with
large teams which perform undercover "buy and bust" operations for
30, 60 or 90 day periods. These teams then move on to the next
target neighborhood and are replaced by smaller, permanent units. 2
Occasionally, TNT teams return to a target area for unannounced
"maintenance" days in the hope of keeping drug dealers off guard."
Eventually, the NYPD argues, TNT transforms the target
neighborhoods:
[a]s these operations continue, street level dealers are arrested and
removed from the drug distribution chain. Eventually, the target
area is no longer conducive to drug trafficking due to the increased
risk of arrest faced by dealers."

By October 1989, twenty-one separate operations had been conducted throughout New York City,55 resulting in a large number of
arrests.56 Defendants charged with narcotics offenses have faced
Point area is a neighborhood of large residential buildings and significant industrial
and commercial areas, with a population that is 67.8 percent Hispanic, 28.3 percent
Black, 1.2 percent White and 2.8 percent "Other." The median household income,
at $6,000, is 70 percent below the citywide average, and the lowest in the borough.
TNT III, supra note 43, at 19.
52. See TNT III, supra note 43, at 1 (noting that "TNT units are designed to be highly
mobile, een within their defined zones of operation, their ability to strike and move on-or
return-without notice reduces the potential for displacement of interdicted drug activities
from one block to another or from one neighborhood to another."); see also infra note 137 and
accompanying text (describing "buy and bust" operations).
53. See Frankel & Freeland, supra note 47, at 108.
54. TNT I, supra note 44, at 18.
55. Letter from Benjamin Ward, Police Commissioner to Hon. Edward I. Koch, Mayor
(Oct. 1989) reprintedin 4 THE TACTICAL NARCOTICS TEAM & THE ANTI-DRUG TASK FORCE,
90 DAY INTERIM REPORT TO THE MAYOR (Oct. 1989) [hereinafter TNT IV]. For a detailed
discussion of the TNT target areas and their official designations, see TNT IV, supra; TNT
III, supra note 43; TNT II, supra note 51; TNT I, supra note 44.
56. By May 1990, TNT had netted over 35,000 drug arrests. Jordan & Gelman, Officials Talk of Cutting TNT, N.Y. Newsday, May 4, 1990, at 7, col. 1, 29, col. 3. Because of
TNT and related efforts, city-wide felony drug arrests in the first 11 months of 1988 rose to
90,000 out of a total 279,000 arrests, more than twice that of five years before. See DeStefano,
Courts Trying Time: Drug Arrests Threaten to Clog Justice System, N.Y. Newsday, Aug. 17,
1989, at 6, col. I (reporting that in the first quarter of 1989 drug arrests, which accounted for
nearly half of all felony arrests in New York City, were running thirty-eight percent ahead of
where they were the previous year); Tyre, Drug-TrackingPlan Expands, N.Y. Newsday, Aug.
4, 1989, at 6, col. 1, col. 3 (reporting 90,000 drug arrests in 1988 with 120,000 drug arrests
expected in 1989); Marriot, Markets of Death, supra note 48, at B4, col. 6 (reporting that in
1987, 27.1% of all arrests were for drug offenses). Felony drug arrests rose from forty-eight
percent of all drug arrests in the second quarter of 1988 to fifty-three percent of all drug
arrests in the second quarter of 1989. 2 NEW YORK STATE Div. OF CRIM. JUST. SERVS., GOVERNOR'S ANTI-CRIME ACTION AGENDA: A MONITORING REPORT ON THE NEW YORK CITY

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 13 (Nov. 1990) [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S Nov. ACTION AGENDA].
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57

and predicate felony sen-

prosecution under severe state narcotics
58

tencing statutes. Drug prosecutions have soared.5 9 A huge number
of drug offenders have been convicted60 and incarcerated. 61 There
has also been a decline of blatant street sales and some, but not all,
non-drug crimes in TNT target areas.6 2 These facts have led the city
administration and police command to declare that TNT is "able to
provide a positive impact and restore social order to our communities"63 by making "a substantial impact in disrupting the flagrant
57. Drug laws passed between 1969 and 1973 made the sale of any amount of illegal
drugs a felony. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-842 (1971). Drug sale offenses are classified as
various degrees of criminal sale of a controlled substance the level of which depends on drug
weight. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1989) (defining "drug weight" as "a mixture or substance containing a detectable amout" of an illegal substance). Criminal possession of a controlled substance is based on the presumption of "intent to sell," the level of which likewise depends on
the drug weight. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.41 (McKinney 1989). The most serious of these
charges are classified as "A-I" felonies, which carry the potential of a life sentence even for a
first offender. See id. § 220.43. The most common felony drug charges are "B" felonies, which
carry a maximum sentence of 25 years for a first offender. See id. § 220.39. Defendants with
prior felony records face greater punishment. See id. §§ 220.00 to .65 (McKinney 1989). In
addition, a 1988 statute raised possession of 500 milligrams of cocaine to a "D" felony, which
is approximately six to eight vials of crack worth about $25 on the street. See id. § 220.06(5).
58. A person who has been convicted of a felony and has served any part of his or her
sentence within the prior ten years, is deemed a "predicate felon" subject to a mandatory
minimum sentence of incarceration in state prison upon a second felony conviction. Still
greater sentencing rules apply to "violent predicate felons," "discretionary persistent felons,"
and "mandatory persistent felons." See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.06 to .10 (McKinney 1989).
These laws were enacted during the move toward harsher punishment in the 1970s. New
York's use of such predicate-sentencing laws is second only to Arkansas. See THE NELSON A.
ROCKEFELLER INST. OF Gov'T, STATE UNIV. OF N.Y., NEW YORK STATE PROJECT 2000, RE-

PORT ON CORRECTIONS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 24 (1986) [hereinafter PROJECT 2000].
59. Drug felony filings increased by 288 % between 1985 and 1989. S. WACHTLER, THE

STATE OF THE JUDICIARY: 1989, at 4 (1989) [hereinafter JUDICIARY 1989].
60. The rate of felony drug convictions rose by 21.6% in the first quarter of 1989 as
compared with the first quarter of 1988. See GOVERNOR'S JULY ACTION AGENDA, supra note
27, at 14, table 7.
61. Approximately 30% of New York City jail inmates are there on charges of drug
sale or possession. Bohlen, Lessons for Prisonersand Prisons,N.Y. Times, July 30, 1989, at
E5, col. 3. State prison sentences for felony drug convictions rose by 16.9% in 1988 and in the
first quarter of 1989 state prison sentences by 26% as compared with the first quarter of 1988.
GoVERNOR'S JULY ACTION AGENDA, supra note 27, at 18, Table 11. By April 1, 1990, approximately 5,367 people entered state prison as a result of TNT-based convictions and
sentences. See Frankel & Freeland, supra note 47, at 108. As a result, more than 30% of state
prison inmates (9,719) are serving sentences for drug-related convictions, compared with 3,194
in 1986, an increase of over 300%. See CORRECTIONAL ASS'N OF NEW YORK, ANTI-CRIME
STRATEGIES AT A TIME OF FISCAL CONSTRAINT 4-5 (1990). In 1989, 45% of new commitments to state prisons were drug-related. Id.
62. See TNT II, supra note 51, at 8 passim; TNT III, supra note 43, at 8 passim; TNT
IV, supra note 55, at 7, 12, 17, 22, 32.
63. See TNT I, supra note 44, at 48 (approving a cooperative effort by government
agencies).
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drug dealing that takes place on street corners. '
There is, however, a great deal of evidence that TNT has failed
to have any substantial impact. It appears that, like in OPP-I, the
crack trade has simply adjusted to TNT. Drug dealers have moved
their operations into building lobbies and stairwells, heavily fortified
apartments or abandoned buildings or storefronts containing apparently legitimate businesses.15 Although these accomodations have not

reduced drug availability, they have made it even more difficult for
law enforcement to conduct narcotics operations."' In addition, many
dealers regard incarceration as a cost of doing business and immediately resume drug sales upon their return from jail or prison.6 7 Those
dealers who do not return are quickly replaced.68 Return and replacement is particularly evident after TNT withdrawal.6 9 As no64. See Letter from Benjamin Ward, New York City Police Commissioner and James
H. Harding, Jr., Special Advisor to the Mayor to Hon. Edward I. Koch, Mayor 1 (Apr. 1989)
reprinted in TNT II, supra note 51, at i.
65. Marriot, Markets of Death: supra note 48, at B4, col. 4. (referring to a DEA Sensitive Internal Intelligence Bulletin). Residents report that despite TNT, numerous crack houses
remain in operation. Lee, East New York, Haunted by Crime, Fights for It's Life, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 5, 1989, at BI, col. 2, B8, col. 6.
66. See Marriot, Selling Milk, Bread and Cocaine in New York, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30,
1989, at Al, col. 3, col. 4-5 (noting that police officials state that once a drug front operation is
identified, "considerable investigation, including surveillance, and undercover purchases from
the premises, is usually required" before there can be an arrest).
67. After a TNT sweep by 150 police in which everyone on a block in Manhattan's
Washington Heights was questioned and many arrested, a resident reported that "[a]ll of the
The raid didn't scare them." Wright & Gelman, A
drug dealers came back the next day ....
Question of Police Tactics, N.Y. Newsday, July 29, 1989, at 4, col. 1, 14, col. 3.
68. For example, after a sweep of four public housing projects in western Queens by
more than 100 officers, the commander of the Narcotics Division conceded that although the
operation had wiped out the project's drug operations, "that doesn't mean there aren't people
waiting in the wings, licking their chops to take over." Drury, 'Home Run' in Queens Drug
Sweep, N.Y. Newsday, May 19, 1989, at 7, ol. 1., 35, col. 4. Captain Charles Mattes, head of
the Queens Area has complained that dealers "have recruited thousands of young addicts who
make the street sales-and risk arrest ... like worker ants .... Arrest them, and somebody
takes their place right away." Wines, Against Drug Tide, Only a HoldingAction, N.Y. Times,
June 24, 1988, at Al, col. 2, B4, col. 3.
69. For example, within days of the November 1988 withdrawal from South Jamaica,
Queens where TNT had made thousands of arrests, see TNT II, supra note 51, at 3, 9, the
drug trade blatantly reappeared despite a permanent police presence on the block where Police
Officer Byrne was killed. See Pitt, Crack Dealers Returning to Streets That Narcotics Units
Swept Clean, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1988, Al, col. 1; see also DeStefano, The Streets Get
Swept, But For How Long?, N.Y. Newsday, Feb. 12, 1989, at 3, col. 1. Residents on that
block are afraid to open their doors or to discuss drugs despite the conviction of Byrnes' killer.
See Queen, A Block Steeped in Drug Fear, N.Y. Newsday, Mar. 31, 1989, at 4, col. 1; see
also McKinley, Jr., Where Fear of Street Violence Rules Life, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1989, at
BI, col. 2; Queen, South JamaicaStill Scourged by Drugs, N.Y. Newsday, Feb. 22, 1989, at
26, col. 2. The results were similar when TNT units left the Queens neighborhoods of Far
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ticed in OPP-I, there are also clear indications that TNT simply displaces much of the drug traffic"0 and drug-related street crime from
71
target areas to other places.
While the seizure of cocaine is occurring at a record-setting
pace, a federal drug enforcement spokesman commented that "[t]he
price has remained stable, and there is rno indication of a reduction
in supply."'7 2 And according to the Chief Judge of the New York
Court of Appeals of New York, "the cocaine market... particularly
in New York, is as healthy now, or healthier, than it ever has
Rockaway, see Marriot, Markets of Death, supra note 48, at Al, col. 5, and Jackson Heights,
see Gelman, Brown: Keep Heat After Drug Sweeps, N.Y. Newsday, Mar. 13, 1990, at 2, col.
2; Carper, After TNT, Drug Business as Usual, N.Y. Newsday, Aug. 20, 1989, at 19, col. 1,
in the Bushwick area of Brooklyn, see Gelman & Yuh, In Bushwick, Little Changed, N.Y.
Newsday, Mar. 15, 1990, at 29, col. 1; Arce, Street of Fear: After Slaying, Residents Tell
Drug Dealers, OK, You Win, N.Y. Newsday, Aug. 10, 1989, at 1, col. 1; Perez-Rivas & Arce,
Drug Fighter's Wife Killed: Cops Had Watch on Family, N.Y. Newsday, Aug. 9, 1989, at 3,
col, 1,in East Harlem, Frankel & Freeland, supra note 47, at 102-03, 108, and the Bronx, see
Vergara, Rebuilding Drug City, Village Voice, Mar. 27, 1990, at 25, col. 1.
Beginning in February 1989, a local and federal task force conducted repeated drug
sweeps of a housing project in the Bronx which resulted in the arrest of 380 people. McKinley,
Constant Reality in a Project: Fear of Violent Drug Gangs, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1989, at
Al, col, 1. One week after an indictment was voted against the leadership of the dominant
drug organization, shootings and drug sales in the project had resumed. Id. at At, col. 1.
70. From the earliest months of TNT, residents and local officials in Queens reported
displacement from one block to another. See Carper, supra note 69, at 20, col. 3. Displacement also occurred in Brooklyn, Lee, supra note 65, at B1, col. 2, where residents have made
similar observations. See Gelman, Cop's Big Crack Attack, N.Y. Newsday, Feb. 15, 1989, at
17, col. 1, col. 2. Even wealthy Manhattanites have experienced the displacement caused by
TNT. See Raab, East Side's Drug Patrol'sTactic: Stare, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1989, at B3,
col. I, col. 6.
71. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., CONTROLLING DRUG ABUSE: A STATUS
REPORT 19, 22 (1988) [hereinafter CONTROLLING DRUG ABUSE]; VERA INST. REPORT, supra

note 14, at 16; Kleiman, supra note 39, at 16. For example, a decline in crime in TNT Queens
Target Areas was paralleled by an increase in adjacent non-TNT areas. See TNT II, supra
note 50, at 10. A decline of over 35 percent in the murder rate in TNT Manhattan North
Target Area I was paralleled by an increase in a neighboring non-TNT area of over 25 percent. See id. at 44. In Manhattan North Target Area 2, although the murder rate in the TNT
area increased by 23 percent, it increased by 50 percent in the immediately adjacent neighborhoods. See TNT III, supra note 43, at 16. Robbery, burglary and grand larceny, however,
which declined in the TNT area, increased more in the adjacent area than anywhere else in
Manhattan North. See id.; cf. L. ZIMMER, supra note 14, at 8-12 (discussing displacement
resulting from OPP-1).
72. Ladd, N.Y. Drug War A Bust, So Far, N.Y. Newsday, Oct. 15, 1989, at 4, col. 2,
col. 3.A 1988 Senate study of drug availability on the national level likewise found "a greater
influx of cocaine than when the war on drugs was declared in 1983, and a cheaper, higher
quality product."

SENATE SUBCOMM. ON TERRORISM, NARCOTICS AND INT'L OPERATIONS OF

THE COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., 100TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON DRUGS, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY 1 (Comm. Print 1988) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT ON DRUGS,
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY].
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been." 73 Nor does it appear that street-level drug trafficking has
been slowed in most areas of the city, including TNT target zones. 4
A reporter who surveyed city neighborhoods in early June 1989
found that "[m]any of the drug dealers ply their trade brazenly,
with little fear of arrest. This is so despite the Police Department's
announced crackdown on street-level sales and vast sums being spent
on the police saturation technique featuring the Tactical Narcotics
Team, or T.N.T.17 5 No one has been heard to claim that police
operations have resulted in any decline in drug abuse. Rather, reliance on the criminal justice system to deal with the crack crisis has
only traumatized the police,7 6 courts,7 7 city jails,7" state
73. JUDICIARY, 1989, supra note 59, at 16.
74. Indeed, the street price of a kilo of cocaine in New York City dropped from $60,000
in 1983 to $15,000 in 1989. Friedman, City Losing the War on All Fronts, N.Y. Newsday,
Aug. 13, 1989, at 4, col. 1; Ladd, supra note 72, at 4, col. 3.
75. Marriot, Markets of Death, supra note 48, at Al, col. 5.
76. Because of the rise in the availability of drugs and drug-related crime and violence,
police patrol cars now spend 87% of their time on 911 calls. Liff, When 911 Means Call
Waiting, N.Y. Newsday, Aug. 15, 1989, at 7, col. 1, 30, col. 1, which in the last five years
have increased by 35%. Powell, Overrun By Calls and Crime, N.Y. Newsday, Aug. 15, 1989,
at 7, col. 4. Furthermore, "arrest-to-arraignment time has increased dramatically-up to
nearly two days in some boroughs-costing the city roughly 30 million a year in police overtime." Crime in the City: The Findings, N.Y. Newsday, Aug. 13, 1989, at 4, col. 3. As a
result of the increase in arrests and constraints on New York City's budget, there are fewer
uniformed police on regular patrol. See Lift, Data Shows Fewer Cops PatrolCity, N.Y. Newsday, Mar. 12, 1989, at 4, col. 4. Further, it has been reported that police have been ordered by
their superiors "to be less aggressive in making 'petty' arrests .... " La Rosa, Collars Off,
Courts Unclog, Daily News, May 14, 1989, at 13, col. 1. The Chief of Patrol, however, denied
that any such order had been given. Id.
77. The backlog of open felony cases increased 16% in 1989 as compared with 1988 and
the dismissal rate increased from 8.8% in 1988 to 12.6% in 1989. DeStefano, The Streets Get
Swept, but For How Long?, supra note 69, at 6, col. 3, 32, cols. 3, 4. The number of cases
which went to trial have fallen to 6.6% of the cases disposed of during the first six months of
1989, down from 10.6% of the cases disposed of during the same period four years earlier. Id.
at 32, col. 4. The length of prison sentences for defendants charged with "B" felony drug
offenses decreased from a median of 24 - 70 months in 1984 to a median of 16 - 48 months in
1988. Id.; see also JUDICIARY 1989, supra note 59, at 80; DeStefano, Jury Delays Free 20%
on Drug Raps, N.Y. Newsday, Jan. 9, 1990, at 3, col. 1; Frankel & Freeland, supra note 47,
at 107.
78. The New York City Department of Corrections custody population has increased
from 15,348 in the second quarter of 1988, GOVERNOR'S Nov. ACTION AGENDA, supra note
56, at 48, to 20,511 in March, 1990. La Rosa, Jail Crowding and Bloodshed, N.Y. Daily
News, Mar. 13, 1990, at 27, col. 3. Overcrowding at Rikers Island resulted in major confrontations between correction officers and inmates in August 1990, including a reported mass
beating of prisoners by guards. Barron, After Uprising at Rikers, Guards Are Said to Have
Beaten Inmates, N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1990, at Al, col. 1; see Jordan, State Panel Corrects
City Jail Boss, N.Y. Newsday, Aug. 30, 1990, at 8, col. 1; Letwin, Our Drug Laws Are to

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1990

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 9
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:795

prisons, 79 district attorneys80 and public defenders."

These facts have led many police to thinly veiled cynicism about
the results of street-level narcotics enforcement. Assistant Chief
Francis C. Hall, who helped to design TNT and until recently commanded the Narcotics Division, now admits that
"[d]rug enforcement ...is like the Vietnam War. In Vietnam, we

underestimated the number of Vietcong and their will to fight. We
appear to be doing the same thing with street-level drug traffickers
....We lost the Vietnam War with a half-million men. We're
'
doing the same thing with drugs."82
At the street level, many undercover officers, who are predominantly African-American and Latino, have concluded that the police
command sends them into grossly unsafe buy operations in order to
achieve a high body count and the resulting headlines.8 As one team
Blame, N.Y. Newsday, Aug. 30, 1990, at 68, col. 1; Rikers Was A Powder Key, N.Y. Newsday, Aug. 26, 1990, at 6, col. 1.
79. By March 1990, state prisons held nearly 52,000 inmates, an increase of almost
100% over 1983. Kolbert, New York Plans to Double-Bunk Inmates in 10 of Its State Prisons, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1990, at Al, col. 1. TNT and similar programs are credited with
much of this increase which have caused 15,000 drug offenders to be lodged in state prisons.
See GOVERNOR'S STATEWIDE ANTI-DRUG ABUSE COUNCIL, STATE OF NEW YORK, ANTIDRUG ABUSE STRATEGY REPORT 7 (1989).

80. In mid-1989 there were 1,393 assistant district attorneys in the six New York City
District Attorney's offices. GOVERNOR'S Nov. ACTION AGENDA, supra note 56, at 40. Yet the
district attorneys are are flooded with cases. DeStefapo, supra note 69; see also Frankel &
Freeland, supra note "47, at 103.
81. Unlike most urban areas where counties employ public defenders, New York City
contracts for these services with The Legal Aid Society, a private non-profit organization
whose 1,000 attorneys provide indigent clients with a variety of legal services, including criminal defense and appeals, civil legal services and juvenile rights. See generally THE LEGAL AID
Soc'Y, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT [hereinafter LEGAL AID 1989 ANNUAL REPORT]. With 650
attorneys, the Criminal Defense Division is the largest trial-level public defender organization
in the United States, See id. at 38; see also GOVERNOR'S JULY ACTION AGENDA, supra note
27, at 31. The number of cases handled by the Division increased from 172,788 in 1987, see
THE LEGAL AID SOC'Y, 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 50, to 225,834 in 1989. LEGAL AID 1989
ANNUAL REPORT, supra. Representation is provided to other indigent clients by attorneys who
are appointed from a panel of private attorneys maintained by the courts as part of the program. NEW YORK STATE DIV. OF CRIM. JUST. SERVS., GOVERNOR'S ANTI-CRIME ACTION
AGENDA: NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 9

(May 1989) [hereinafter

GOVER-

NOR'S MAY ACTION AGENDA] (estimating that in 1987 in "'over 70 percent of the Supreme
Court cases disposed of . . the defendant was represented by a publicly-funded attorney.'"
About 55 percent of these cases were represented by Assigned Counsel, with the remainder
represented by the Legal Aid Society.)
82. Massing, supra note 6, at 62.
83. See Tyre, Supervisors Ripped in Cop Shooting, N.Y. Newsday, Aug. 17, 1989, at
19, col. 1,cols. 4-5; Henican, Wounded Cop Clings to Life; Shot in Cocaine 'Buy-Bust, N.Y.
Newsday, Aug. 11, 1989, at 5, col. 1, 29, col. 4 (quoting a police officer's statement that
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member said, "[i]t's just not worth it anymore. .

.

.We're getting

shot out there and the drugs don't seem to go away. .

going to make a buy again."84
III.

UNDERSTANDING

.

.I'm never

THE FAILURE OF STREET-LEVEL NARCOTICS
ENFORCEMENT

There are several reasons for the extremely limited effectiveness
of OPP-I and the complete failure of TNT. First, such operations do
not reach the multi-billion dollar international narcotics business to
which drug prohibition has given birth. 5 Thus, by October 1989, the
NYPD reported that TNT had resulted in no completed high-level
investigations.88 Second, at the street level, inner-city drug use and
traffic are impervious to the various programs because of the interaction between crack, drug prohibition and declining social conditions.
This is particularly true of the largely African-American and Latino
poor and/or working class neighborhoods in which most TNT teams
7
have operated.
Historically, the African-American community has suffered a
"[t]hey're just throwing us out there to the wolves.").
84. Gelman, Cops Weigh Risks After Shooting, N.Y. Newsday, Aug. 13, 1989, at 7,
col. 3.
85. See SENATE REPORT ON DRUGS, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY, supra
note 72, at 8-9 (listing domestic effects of international drug trafficking). The cocaine branch
of the narcotics business is dominated by the immensely powerful Colombia-based organizations, commonly referred to as the Medellin and Cali Cartels. See id. at 25-34 (describing
Colombia's involvement in drug trade); see also BUREAU OF INT'L NARCOTICS MATTERS.U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, INT'L NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 70 (March 1989) [hereinafter STATE DEP'T STRATEGY REPORT]; NATIONAL NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE CONSUMERS
COMM., THE NNICC REPORT 1988, at 2 (1989) [hereinafter THE 1988 NNICC REPORT].
The cartels launder their funds in legitimate international and United States financial institutions. SENATE REPORT ON DRUGS, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY, supra, at 11220 (describing money laundering). The cocaine trade has thus become the basis for the entire
national and regional economy of Latin America. See Marshall, Drugs and United States
Foreign Policy, in DEALING WITH DRUGS 137, 141 (R. Hamowy ed. 1987) (stating that
"[d]rugs are hardly less important to Colombia's economy, where they approach even coffee as
earners of foreign exchange."); id. at 140 (noting that "Bolivia survives only by the grace of
cocaine.). The cocaine trade has also become prevalent in parts of the United States such as
Southern Florida. Cf. S. WISOTSKY, supra note 18, at 142 (noting that by 1984, the Miami
branch of the Federal Reserve Bank had "accumulated a cash surplus of $7 billion, nearly all
of it suspected to be untaxed drug money."). In New York City, the cartels supply cocaine to
some 35 Jamaican "posses" who service predominantly African-American neighborhoods, see
Meier, Drug Trade's Army of 'Crack' Gunmen, N.Y. Newsday, Mar. 12, 1989, at 5, col. 2,
20, col. 3 (describing "posses" as drug gangs) and to Dominican "crews" who dominate the
trade in upper-Manhattan's Washington Heights and other predominantly Latino neighborhoods. Massing, supra note 6, at 38, cols. 1-2, 40, col. 2, 41, col. 2.
86. TNT IV, supra note 55, at 39.
87. See supra note 51 (describing typical TNT neighborhoods).
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subordinate relationship to most other sections of society because of
the economy's need for a large, cheap and sometimes reserve labor
pool.8 8 In recent years, however, there has been a huge drain from
the inner-city of stable blue collar jobs which once provided work to
many of the parents and grandparents of today's youth."' This economic development has combined with tremendous assaults of many
of the economic and social gains of the Black movements of the
1960's-from ferocious cuts in social services, to assaults on affirmative action-to push much of the community into deeper impoverishment and despair.90 As a result, twenty-five years since the Johnson
Administration launched the War on Poverty, 91 thirty-five years after the Supreme Court outlawed school segregation in Brown v.
Board of Education,92 and 127 years after the Emancipation Proclamation,9 3 the communities which TNT and other such programs operate suffer growing poverty and intolerable conditions in, and
shortages of, housing, childcare facilities, schools, transportation and
88. For a discussion of the historical relationship between the subordination of AfricanAmericans and the structure of the American economy, see generally D. FUSFELD & X. BATES,
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE URBAN GHETTO

(1984); J.

GREENBERG, RACE AND STATE

IN CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (1980); M. REICH, RACIAL INEQUALITY: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1981); X. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987).

89. See Hemphill, Getting Off Welfare: It's No Easy Job, May 1, 1990, at 19, col. 1;
Kerr, Addiction's Hidden Toll: Poor Familiesin Turmoil, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1988, at Al,
col. 1.
90. For instance, the federal government cut $57 billion in aid nationally between 1981
and 1987, including $6.8 billion from the food stamp program and $5.2 billion from child
nutrition programs. See Hemphill, Study: City's Poverty Soars, N.Y. Newsday, Nov. 15,
1989, at 19, col. 1.See generally CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, STILL FAR
FROM THE DREAM: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BLACK INCOME, EMPLOYMENT AND POVERTY

35-44 (1988) [hereinafter FAR FROM THE DREAM] (noting several government programs which
have been cut recently, affecting low income groups comprised mainly of black single
mothers).
In New York City, a recent study found that due to major cuts in federal poverty programs, there has been a substantial increase in poverty since the mid-1970s. See Hemphill,
supra, at 19, col. 1. At that time 13 percent of the population in N.Y. City was below the
official poverty level; by 1987, that figure had nearly doubled to 23.2 percent. See id.
91. See POLITICAL PROFILES: THE JOHNSON YEARS 253 (N. Lichtenstein ed. 1976) (noting that on January 8, 1964, President Johnson announced an "unconditional war on poverty
in America.").
92.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

93. See H. TREFOUSSE, LINCOLN'S DECISION FOR EMANCIPATION 99-100 (1975) (stating
that Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863).
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decent employment opportunities.94 Police abuse is epidemic.95 New
York remains a segregated city in which those of color enter many
white neighborhoods only at their peril.9
In essence, the description of society given by the 1968 National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders remains valid.9 Perhaps
even more so today than in the 1960's, there are two societies in the
United States today; "[o]ne, largely Negro and poor, located in the
central cities; the other, predominantly white and affluent, located in
the suburbs and outlying areas."98 But unlike the 1960's, when the
rising expectations evident in the Civil Rights and Black Power
movements led many alienated youth to political activism,99 the absence of such hope has left many minority youth today resentful,
angry, and hopeless at an early age. "For the unemployed and the
desperate, the drug traffic offers money and the illusion of security.
For the pained and the alienated, the confused and the dispossessed,
drugs offer an anesthetic and an escape."' 00
These conditions begin to explain why there are as many as
600,000 cocaine users in New York City-most of them
crackheads-an increase of more than three times between 1986 and
1988.101 Moreover, by imposing risks on distributors, drug prohibition raises the street-price of crack to well-above what it would cost
94. See generally FAR FROM THE DREAM, supra note 90, at 35-44; NEw YORK CITY BD.
OF EDUC., HUMAN RELATIONS TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT (1989) (outlining the need for the
restructuring of the educational systems within school districts serving largely minority and
low income students so that such systems are more equivalent to programs developed in the
more affluent areas); THE REPORT OF THE MAYOR'S COMMISSION ON BLACK NEW YORKERS
(1988) (indicating the extent to which African-Americans continue to be discriminated against
and the restraints upon them because of such obstacles); Hemphill, supra note 90, at 19, col. 1
(discussing the extent to which federal cuts in poverty programs have affected New Yorkers).
95. See infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
96. See Smothers, Housing Segregation: New Twists and Old Results, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 1, 1987, at BI, col.'2.
97. See Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 22 (1968).
98. Id. at 27.
99. See id. at 10-11.
100. Jackson, supra note 12, at 58, col. 1 (noting Reverend Jesse Jackson's position).

Obviously, middle class suburban crack users must be drawn to drugs out of a general alienation from society rather than from the inner-city conditions described here. Cf. Levine,
America's Addiction to Addictions, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 5, 1990, at 62, 63

(noting that having an addiction might indicate that a person has "such pre-disposing traits as
a sense of alienation, impulsivity, and a need for instant gratification.").

101.

See Marriott, After 3 Years, Crack Plague in New York Only Gets Worse, N.Y.

Times, Feb. 20, 1989, at Al, col. 2. In 1986 there were approximately 182,000 regular cocaine

users in New York City. See id.
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to produce and distribute legally. 102 The resulting price rise has contributed to an explosion of street crime, fueled in large part by
crack-users seeking to finance their habit.03 There has also been a
serious increase in intra-family theft and violence as users seek to
support their habit, and child abandonment
by parents whose only
04
focus is finding the next vial of crack.
Drug prohibition has also been linked to an increase of health
problems and intra-family conflict, which are on the rise in the inner-city. It has been reported that the barter by women of sex for
crack in the inner-city has replaced dirty needles as the main reason
for the increase in AIDS among drug users. 0 5 The sex for crack
07
phenomena 0 6 has also led to the first syphilis epidemic in decades,
102. For a more detailed explanation of this part of the drug decriminalization debate,
see Ostrowski, The Moral and Practical Case for Drug Legalization, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV.
607, 647 (1990).
103. By one estimate, 40% of all crime nationally is thus directly or indirectly related to
drug prohibition. See Ostrowski, supra note 102, at 647-50 & nn. 195-97. In New York,
where it is estimated that 60 percent of city jail inmates are addicted to drugs and/or alcohol
when confined, see GOVERNOR'S Nov. ACTION AGENDA, supra note 56, at 62, the 1989 violent
crime rate increased by 4% over 1988, and robbery, which is regarded as the main indicator of
street violence, increased by 7.9% to 93,337, giving New York City the worst robbery record
in the United States. McKinley, Killings in '89 Set a Record in New York, N.Y. Times, Mar.
31, 1990, at 27, col. 5. And while property crime in 1989 decreased slightly by 2.3%, it increased by 11.6% in the area of motor vehicle theft. Id. at 30, col. 4. Law enforcement attributes these increases to drugs, particulary crack. Id. On average, the 1989 violent crime rate
meant a daily toll of five homicides, nine rapes and 237 robberies. See Friedman, supra note
74, at 19, col. 1.
104. Over the past four years, domestic violence has increased by 157 percent. See N.Y.
Times, June 23, 1988, at B4, col. 3 (stating that William Grinker, Commissioner of New York
City's Human Resources Adminstration, has linked these figures to the crack epidemic). From
1985 to 1989, child neglect and abuse cases in New York City rose by 232% due in large part
to drugs. See JUDICIARY 1989, supra note 59, at 15. In addition, outside the New York City
area, neglect and abuse cases rose by 76%. Id.
105. See Lambert, AIDS Danger Rises for Cocaine Users, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1988,
at A22, col. 5; see also Hilts, Spread of AIDS by Heterosexuals Remains Slow, N.Y. Times,
May 1, 1990, at CI, col. 4; Altman, Who's Stricken and How: AIDS Patternis Shifting, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 5, 1989, at Al, col. 1 (stating that "[t/he AIDS virus has been slowly spreading
among heterosexuals who do not use intravenous drugs, but again, the spread is mainly among
the sex partners of drug abusers."). AIDS is becoming a disease of poor African-American
and Latino heterosexuals and babies, who now together constitute one quarter of the current
AIDS cases. See Altman, supra at Al, col. 1. Single adults dying of AIDS, and mentally ill
crack abusers, are the fastest growing segment of the homeless. See Foran, AIDS, Crack Swell
Homeless Ranks, N.Y. Newsday, Jan. 29, 1989, at 19, col. 1. Nearly one third of the city's
34,000 single adult homeless fall into one or both of these categories. See PARTNERSHIP FOR
THE HOMELESS, INC., AIDS-THE CUTrING EDGE OF HOMELESSNESS IN NEW YORK CITY 47
(1989).
106. See Queen, Drugs Stimulate the Spread of Prostitution,N.Y. Newsday, Sept. 19,
1988, at 9, col. I, col. 2.
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which has resulted in thousands of stillborn births and birth defects. 10 8 Moreover, because the production of crack is completely unregulated, its inherent hazards are significantly magnified by adulteration and impurity. 10 9 None of this is to say that such problems
exist only because of crack or that the only harm in crack abuse is
due to drug prohibition. The point, however, is that drug prohibition
has greatly exacerbated these problems.
Furthermore, drug prohibition has acted on these same social
conditions to lead many inner-city youths into the crack trade. The
mid-level organizations supply cocaine in powder form to the streetlevel dealers who easily convert it into crack." 0 The retail street
trade is conducted largely by teenagers, some of whom earn up to
several thousand dollars a week"' and are thereby the primary
source of income for many poor families." 2 Large numbers of teenage girls have enlisted in the trade," 3 and even elementary school
children participate, some earning as much as $300 per day." 4 As a
result, many community residents have strong family and economic
steady ties to people who use and/or sell drugs. Thus it is more difficult than in areas with substantial white middle class populations for
107. See Kerr, Crack and Resurgence of Syphilis is SpreadingAIDS Among the Poor,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1989, at Al, col. 1, col. 2.
108. See French, Rise in Babies Hurt by Drugs Is Predicted, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18,
1989, at BI, col. 5.
109. "Illegal drugs contain poisons, are of uncertain potency, and are injected with dirty
needles." Ostrowski, supra note 102, at 652. Approximately eighty percent, or 2,400 of the
3,000 annual deaths attributed to cocaine and heroin are the result of such black market factors. See id. at 655 Table 1, 669.
It is interesting to note, however, that for every cocaine-related death in 1987, approximately 300 people died as a result of tobacco use and 100 from using alcohol. See Reinarman
& Levine, The Crack Attack: Politics and Media in America's Latest Drug Scare, in IMAGES
OF ISSUES: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL PROBLEMS 120 (J. Best ed. 1989).
110. T. WILLIAMS, supra note 39, at 7-9, 34-39. As one DEA agent explained, "[flora
small investment you can buy some cocaine, convert it to crack in the kitchen and begin distributing. This makes for alot of entrepreneurs." Massing, supra note 6, at 38.
11I.
Police believe that a crack and heroin ring run out of one family's apartment in
East New York 'earned $8,000 a day. Seaton, Three Held on Drug Rap, N.Y. Daily News,
Sept. 15, 1989, at KSI 1, col. 3.
112. Kolata, On Streets Ruled By Crack, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
113. See supra note 106.
114. Mid-level traffickers enlist children and young teenagers in the trade because they
face less severe penalties if caught and are generally easier to manipulate than adults. Recent
arrests of such children have totalled between 130 and 150 per month. Bernstein, Crack Arrests of Young Soar, N.Y. Newsday, Mar. 14, 1989, at 4, col. 1, and along with their involvement in the trade has come a dramatic increase in the arrest of children with weapons (up
24.5% since 1986). DeStefano, Big Jump in Arrests of Armed Kids; Officials Blame Crack
for Increased Cases, N.Y. Newsday, Mar. 22, 1989, at 5, col. 1.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1990

19

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 9
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:795

police to identify dealers and receive community cooperation.115 As
Zimmer pointed out:
[p]oor, run-down neighborhoods hold some advantages for streetlevel drug dealers .... [T]here is often a transient population on
the streets and in the local parks, making it difficult for the police
to identify persons involved in the drug trade. Buyers and sellers
often live in the neighborhoods themselves and are similar to other
residents in terms of class, race, ethnicity and general appearance,
again making them indistinguishable to the police. And even residents may be reluctant to report them, either out of loyalty or fear
of retaliation.116

Young people sell drugs on the streets either to finance their own
crack habit, or as an alternative to welfare or the minimum wage at
McDonald's.L 7 In large part, selling drugs is a matter of making a
decent income. As a Washington Heights street-level trafficker explains, "I have tried to work for the white man . .

. But the more

you work, the richer he gets.""" Phillipe Bourgois, an anthropologist
who recently spent five years studying street culture in East Harlem,
has noted that enlistment in the crack trade is the closest that many
inner-city youth can come to the pursuit of success, pointing out
that:
ambitious, energetic, inner-city youths are attracted to the under115. For example, on the predominantly Latino block in the Bushwick section of Brooklyn, a reporter found that:
[a]lthough many hate the sight of dealers on the same street where their children
play, they do not see them as an invading army. Many of the dealers and addicts,
residents say, are part of the community's intricate web of blood ties and friendship
...they [residents] have learned to live safely in the shadow of the drug trade by
following a simple live-and-let-live rule. The dealers pose no danger to ordinary residents unless they [dealers] believe someone is telling the police of their activities.
McKinley, Jr., Friendship and Fear Undermine a Will to Fight Drugs in Brooklyn, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 18, 1989, at Al, col. 5.
Obviously, other TNT zone residents try to rid their communities of drugs, as has been
demonstrated in community anti-drug patrols. See, e.g., Morgan, Muslims Start Patrol to
Fight Crack in Brooklyn, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1988, § 1, at 29, ol. 2; Jamieson, Blacks and
Hasidim Join to Fight Drug Addiction, Newsday, July 5, 1988, at NY-B 23, col. 2; Kerr,
Citizen Anti-Crack Patrols: Vigilance or Vigilantism?, N.Y. Times, May 23, 1988, at Bl, col.
2; Thousands Demonstrate Against Crime, Newsday, Aug. 9, 1989, at 33, col. 1; English,
Gregory, Sharpton Put Drug Dealers on Notice, Newsday, Oct. 6, 1989, at 23, col. 2.
116. L. ZIMMER, supra note 14, at 13.
117. See Bourgois, Just Another Night on Crack Street, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1989, §
6 (Magazine), at 53, 62, cols. 2-3, 65, cols. 3-5.
118. See T. WILUAMS, supra note 39, at 67; see also Bourgois, supra note 117, at 62,
col. 3 (stating that many drug dealers are proud that they are not being exploited by the
"white man" by holding jobs such as delivery boy, supermarket bagger or hospital orderly).
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ground economy precisely because they believe in the American
dream. Like many in the mainstream, they are frantically trying to
get their piece of the pie as fast as possible. In fact, they follow the
traditional model for upward mobility: aggressively setting themselves up as private entrepreneurs. Without stretching the point too
much, they can be seen in conventional terms as rugged individualists on an unpredictable frontier where fortune, fame and destruction are all just around the corner.' 9

The supervisor of one FBI office conceded, "[w]hat alternative have
I got for them [young dealers]? . . . I don't like to admit it, but

they're pretty good capitalists.' 120 Added to, and perhaps as important as the money, is the excitement, status and self-respect also accorded to successful street-level dealers. 21
Employment opportunities, however, are offset by the tremendous violence that accompanies the local drug trade. In 1989, there
were a record 1,905 homicides in New York City, the highest number of any city in the country. 2 2 Many of these were due to the
violent competition between traffickers,'123 and has led residents to
feel the need to arm themselves. 24 The tremendous level of drug119. Bourgois, supra note 117, at 65, cols. 3-4.
120. Mayer, In the War on Drugs, Toughest Foe May Be The Alienated Youth, Wall
St. J., Sept. 8, 1989, at Al, col. 1, A7, col. 1.
121. See Bourgois, supra note 117, at 94. In reality, however, most street-level dealers
make very little money. Kolata, Despite Its Promises of Riches, the Crack Trade Seldom
Pays, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
122. McKinley, Jr,, Killings in "89Set a Record in New York, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31,
1990, at BI, col. 5. Of those killed in 1989, at least 30 were hit by stray bullets as innocent
bystanders. Daley, Wrong Place at the Wrong Time: Stray Bullets Kill More Bystanders,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1990, at 1, col. 1. But see Hevesi, Drug Wars Don't Pause to Spare the
Innocent, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1989, at A25, col. 3 (reporting that no agency keeps statistics
on the frequency of crimes against bystanders).
123. One study, which examined homicides in 23 percent of New York City's 75 precincts during 8 months of 1988, determined that 52.7 percent of the killings were due to drugs,
and that of those, 74 percent had a "systemic" link to disputes between rivals in the unstable
distribution system of crack and other drugs. P.J. Goldstein, H.H. Brownstein, P.J. Ryan &
P.A. Bellucci, supra note 39. According to the Manhattan District Attorney, over two-thirds
of the homicides in Northern Manhattan in 1989 resulted from turf wars between 30 rival
gangs. McKinley, Jr., supra note 122, at 27, col. 5., col. 3. Dr. Kildare Clarke, Associate
Medical Director of the Kings County Hospital emergency room in Brooklyn, noted that except for car accidents, nearly all of the critical wounds suffered by his patients under the age
of 25 were the result of drug-related violence. Gelman, City Doc: Drugs Should Be Legal,
N.Y. Newsday, July 25, 1989, at 19, col. 1, 32, col. 3.
124. A Gallup Poll taken for New York Newsday, a New York daily newspaper, showed
that almost I out of every 10 New Yorkers kept a gun in their homes and that 1 out of every
20 reportedly carried a gun when going out. See Richards, Living in Fear, N.Y. Newsday,
Aug. 13, 1989, at 4, col. 1, 18, col. 1. In 1988, police seized 16,370 firearms, a 9 percent
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related violence is also reflected in the fact that drug dealers no
longer respect the unwritten rule against shooting police, a development which led a DEA supervisor to conclude that "we're in the
beginning of the situation you see now in Colombia. ' 25
In light of these dynamics, it is no surprise that law enforcement has failed to have any impact on inner-city drugs, or on drugrelated crime and violence. As sociologist Terry Williams noted, conditions in Washington Heights are a set-up to lure kids into the "underground [which] offers status and prestige-rewards they are unlikely to attain in the regular economy-and is the only real
economy for many."'1 26 No matter how harsh, the criminal justice
system's sanctions are still less deadly than the well-known occupational hazards that inner-city youth in the drug trade accept as the
price of unparalleled opportunity for money, prestige and power.127
If anything, street level enforcement has the effect of stimulating enlistment in the crack trade, just as the leading actor's illness makes
room for the understudy. Attorney James Ostrowski explains that
"[the publicized conviction of a drug dealer, by instantly creating a
vacancy in the lucrative drug business, has the same effect as hanging up a help-wanted sign saying, 'Drug dealer needed - $5,000 a
week - exciting work.' 128
IV.

THE PRICE OF STREET-LEVEL ENFORCEMENT

In addition to their ineffectiveness and the general damage they
cause as an arm of drug prohibition, New York City street-level narincrease over 1978. Where the Guns Are, What They Are, Who Has Them, N.Y. Times, Feb.
5, 1989, at E4, col. 1. In an interview, the Commander of the New York Police Department's
Ballistics Unit stated that the "popular" guns include 9 millimeters, .38 calibers, .45 calibers,
Uzis and lntertechs. Id. at col. 5.
125.

Drug Mayhem on Rise, Top Fed Warns, N.Y. Newsday, Oct. 25, 1989, at 19, col.

126.

T. WILLIAMS, surpa note 39, at 132.

1.

127. This may explain why Iran has not made a dent in domestic drug traffic despite
execution of scores of drug offenders in recent years. See BUREAU OF INTERNAT'L NARCOTICS
MATTERS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT

147 (March 1989). As Lynn E. Zimmer noted in her study of Operation Pressure Point I,

"[d]rug sellers are accustomed to the possibility of arrest, accepting it as a built-in cost of
doing business ... and even the threat of extraordinarily severe punishments may not deter
them." L. ZIMMER, supra note 14, at 9. Therefore, as Columbia Law Professor H. Richard

Uviller points out, "[t]here are as many people selling crack on the streets as before the TNT
went into business. That means we can have an infinite number of arrests, and if there are
enough judges, we can have an infinite number of convictions." Lee, Attack on Crack: More
Arrests, Fewer Long Sentences, N.Y. Times, May 31, 1989, at B1, col. 1, B5, col. 1.
128. Ostrowski, supra note 102, at 645.
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cotics operations take a high toll on inner-city communities through
the criminalization of residents, 12 9 the trampling of constitutional
rights, 130 police brutality31 ' and the drain of badly-needed fiscal
resources.

13 2

A.

Violation of ConstitutionalRights and the
Erosion of Due Process

A study by the American Bar Association noted that "[a] cer-

tain disregard for the Fourth Amendment, specifically in drug cases,
may be an unavoidable by-product of a drug problem so pervasive
that the police feel they sometimes must violate constitutional restraints in order to regain control of the streets."'3 3
In the 1960's, street-level narcotics operations in New York

City generated the notorious "dropsy cases" in which officers routinely related perjured testimony in which defendants had conveniently thrown drugs to the ground just as police arrived at the
scene. 34 In the early days of Operation Pressure Point I,'35 the police put all of those arrested "through the system" for several days in
order, according to an observer, to subject "every arrestee . . . to
some sanction, including those against whom drug charges were later
dropped and even those few who were acquitted."'3 6 Today, mass
indiscriminate arrests without probable cause are common during
drug sweeps.' 7 In addition, law enforcement officials in all branches
129. See infra notes 145-59 and accomanpanying text.
130. See infra notes 133-39 and accompany text.
131. See infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
132. See infra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
133. See CRIMINAL JUST. SECTION, Am. BAR. ASS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 46
(1988).
134. See Kleiman, supra note 39, at 27.
135. See supra notes 21-41 and accompanying text.
136. See L. ZIMMER, supra note 14, at 5. Violations of constitutionalrights were also
evident in other pre-TNT operations. For example, following observation sales and some "buy
and busts," 30 police officers indiscriminately surrounded, seized and searched dozens of people who happened to be in the area, during a lunchtime sweep at the W.R. Grace & Co. Plaza
in midtown Manhattan on October 30, 1985. See Wilkerson, Midtown Drug Sweep Criticized
as Violation of Civil Rights, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1985, at B3, col. 1.
137. For example, in a publicized sweep on July 19, 1989, the Chief of the Organized
Crime Control Bureau (OCCB), led 150 officers to a block in upper-Manhattan's Washington
Heights. See Wright & Gelman, supra note 67, at 14, col. 3. Police sealed off the block and
detained virtually all of the 100 people who were present there for up to two hours, during
which time police taped numbers oh the chests of those arrested, took their pictures and had
them viewed by undercover officers. Id. at 4, col. 2 By the end of the operation, police made
only 24 felony and two misdemeanor narcotics arrests, id. at 14, col. 1, which strongly suggests
that there was no probable cause to seize those who were arrested.
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of government justify proposals to reduce defendant's rights in such
While in recent years the federal courts have greatly restricted the fourth amendment's
protections under the federal constitution, see, e.g., Legalization of Illicit Drugs: Impact and
Feasibility,Part I: HearingBefore the Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control of the
House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 409-56 (1988) [hereinafter WISOTSKY
STATEMENT] (statement of Steven Wisotsky, Professor of Law, Nova Univ. Law Center) (discussing the development of a federal "drug exception" to the Constitution), the New York
appellate courts have continued to recognize much greater rights for defendants in the area of
search and seizure under provisions of the state constitution. See, e.g., People v. Alvarez, 70
N.Y.2d 375, 521 N.Y.S.2d 212, 515 N.E.2d 898 (1987) (holding that although police failure
to take a breath sample for later testing is not violative of the Federal Constitution, it cannot
be assumed that the same does not violate the State constitution).
In one case, which concerned a "buy and bust" operation in the Bronx, evidence was
suppressed because the court found that the backup team had seized a man whose only resemblance to the perpetrator was that he was an African-American. See People v. Slay, N.Y.L.J.
June 1, 1989, at 24, col. 4 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Bronx Co.). Evidence was suppressed in other
cases where Latino defendants were arrested without probable cause. See, e.g., People v. Martinez, N.Y.L.J., May 22, 1989, at 24, col. 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Co.) (allowing suppression
of money found on defendant after his arrest for drug sale because conversation with suspected
drug dealer is not probable cause); People v. Rodriguez, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 23, 1987, at 13, col. 3
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. Bronx Co.) (allowing suppression of LSD pills found on the defendant because merely being present in the vicinity of a "buy and bust" is insufficient justification to
warrant arrest); People v. Reynolds, 136 Misc. 2d 307,518 N.Y.S.2d 551 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
1987) (allowing suppression of evidence where a defendant was merely present in the vicinity
of a buy and bust).
Evidence has also been suppressed in numerous other drug arrests on the street, in cases
following automobile stops, and in building and apartment arrests. See, e.g., People v. Mills,
145 A.D.2d 578, 535 N.Y.S. 2d 759 (1988), appeal denied 73 N.Y.2d 924, 539 N.Y.S.2d 309,
536 N.E.2d 638 (1989) (without opinion) (allowing suppression of physical evidence because
probable cause to arrest was not established by observation of exchange in drug prone area);
People v. Marine, 142 A.D.2d 368, 536 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1989) (allowing suppression of gun
found on the defendant because there was no probable cause); People v. Knight, 138 A.D.2d
294, 526 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1988) (holding that there was a lack of probable cause for police
search of brown paper located on taxi cab floor between defendant's legs); Pebple v. Archie,
136 A.D.2d 553, 523 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1988), appeal dismissed, 71 N.Y.2d 892, 527 N.Y.S.2d
1001, 523 N.E.2d 308 (1988) (dismissed without opinion) (stating that mere observation of
defendant standing with three other men on the corner of a drug prone location did not constitute probable cause); People v. Leung, 116 A.D.2d 666, 497 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1986), affd 68
N.Y.2d 734, 506 N.Y.S.2d 320, 497 N.E.2d 687 (1986) (stating that suppression of physical
evidence is not required where police officers were justified in approaching defendant in "drug
zone"); People v. Reyes, N.Y.L.J. May 30, 1989, at 23., col. 1 (S.Ct., N.Y. Co.) (allowing
suppression of evidence because knocking on the door of an apartment that the police were
searching did not constitute probable cause); People v. Munoz, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 24, 1989, at 24,
col. 4 (S. Ct., Bronx Co.) (allowing suppression of evidence because a mere exchange of an
unidentified item for cash in a drug-prone area is not sufficient to establish probable cause);
People v. Holman, N.Y.L.J. Mar. 22, 1989, at 22, col. 6 (S. Ct., N.Y. Co.) (allowing suppression of evidence because probable cause was not established where there was no evidence of
the original information given during an alleged 911 call); People v. Britch, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 20,
1989, at 23, col. 3 (S.Ct., Bronx Co.) (allowing suppression of physical evidence seized from
defendant while a passenger in a car because defendant's hand movement inside his jacket
while the driver's papers were being checked did not constitute probable cause); People v.
Quinones, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 17, 1988, at 25, col. 5 (N.Y. Crim. Ct., N.Y. Co.) (holding that
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areas as grand jury proceedings, peremptory challenges to prospective jurors and the right to jury trials in misdemeanor cases, 138 and
regarding the prosecution's duty to turn over prior statements of witnessess, use of currently inadmissible defendant statements, and a
defendant's speedy trial rights. 13 9
B. Police Abuse
Police abuse in the minority communities which has often resulted in the death of civilians under questionable circumstances, is a
chronic epidemic in New York City. The 1964 shooting death of a
fifteen year-old black youth by a white police officer in Harlem set
off days of rebellion in the City's African-American neighborhoods. 40 In more recent years, the police have been widely criticized

in the deaths of African-American citizens. 14' And in the summer of
1989, while Spike Lee's film Do the Right Thing depicted the murradio message about suspicious activity giving only the description of the Latino defendant was
insufficient to establish probable cause); People v. Fernandez, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 15, 1988, at 19,
col. I (Sup. Ct., Bronx Co.) (allowing suppression of physical evidence because mere presence
of an individual in a high crime area cannot transfer his otherwise innocuous behavior into
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity); People v. Smith, N.Y.L.J., June 21, 1988, at 23, col.
1 (N.Y. Crim. Ct., N.Y. Co.) (allowing suppression of evidence found during a search because
a crack pipe in the defendant's pocket could not justify the full search of the defendant);
People v. Lee, N.Y.L.J., May 23, 1988, at 23, col. 4 (S. Ct., Bronx Co.) (allowing suppression
of physical evidence because police observation of money exchange did not justify search);
People v. Crosby, N.Y.L.J. Sept. 21, 1987, at 16, col. 2 (N.Y. Crim. Ct., N.Y. Co.) (allowing
suppression of physical evidence found on the defendant in a residential building lobby because
an anonymous tip was not specific enough to justify a search).
It has been the author's experience that the unusually high number of these decisions
understate the depth of the problem as many courts diligently attempt to justify police conduct
so as not to be perceived as being "soft on crime." Moreover, a prosecutor or judge who is
aware of the potential for serious constitutional attack may sweeten the plea offer before the
search and seizure issue is litigated.

138.

JUDICIARY

1989, supra note 59, at 21-23.

139. See, e.g., NEW YORK ST. LAW ENF. COUNCIL, LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, 1989, at
43-46.
140. B. MusE, THE AMERICAN NEGRO REVOLUTION, FROM NONVIOLENCE TO BLACK
POWER 1963-67, at 127-30 (1968).
141. See, e.g., Purdum, Questions Swirl Around a Fatal Shooting by Police, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 5, 1988, at B1, col. 2 (accusing police of shooting too quickly when I1 shots killed
a black man who police claim lunged at them with a knife and witnesses claim was unarmed);
McCallister, Police Racial Violence Rapped, Daily News, Aug. 25, 1988, at KSI, col. 1 (accusing police of racially motivated shootings). As recently as 1983, a congressional subcommittee held hearings on allegations of racial brutality by the NYPD. See Roberts, Panel Sees
Some Police Racism in New York, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1984, at 1, col. 4; Roberts, Hearing
On Police Cut Off in Harlem, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1983, at Al, col. 1; Roberts, Police Brutality Charged At Forum, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1983, at Al, col. 1; Roberts, When Police
Are Accused Of Brutality, N.Y. Times Oct. 27, 1983, at Bl. col. 1.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1990

25

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 9
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:795

der of a young African-American by white police in the BedfordStuyvesant section of Brooklyn, at least three African-Americans
died in custody, allegedly as a result of police abuse.142
The aggressive and largely indiscriminate tactics employed in
narcotics operations have contributed significantly to this pattern of
abuse. 143 Such abuse is bound to increase with rising police casual142. On May 21, 1989, white New York City Housing officers allegedly beat to death
Richard Luke of Queensbridge, while he was handcuffed and lying face down on the floor of
his apartment building during a respiratory attack. Cooper, Did The Cops Kill Richard
Luke?, Village Voice, July 11, 1989, at 26, col. 1.On June 3, 1989, Owen James Williams, Jr.,
of Bushwick, Brooklyn, was allegedly beaten to death by officers from the 83d precinct while
he was lying face down in the street. R. Hornung, No Name in the Morgue, Village Voice,
Aug. 1, 1989, at 11, col. 1. On July 10, 1989, Kevin Thorpe, a mentally retarded Brooklyn
resident, suffocated on his apartment floor as 13 officers hit him with nightsticks for fifteen
minutes while he was cuffed and in leather restraint. See Hurtado, FBI to Monitor Probe Into
Death, N.Y. Newsday, Aug. 17, 1989, at 18, col. 1; English, Lawyer: Try Cops In Custody
Death, N.Y. Newsday, Aug. 8, 1989, at 20, col. 1; Giordano & Rist, 'Police Violence' Assailed, N.Y. Newsday, Aug. 6, 1989, at 3, col. 1; McKinley Jr., Family Say Retarded Victim
Couldn't Heed Officers, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1989, at 28, col. 1; Giordano & Rivera, ME
Blames cops in Death, N.Y. Newsday, Aug. 5, 1989, at 4, col. 1; McKinley Jr., Officers Implicated in Report on Death Of a Retarded Man, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1989, at Al, col. 6. Some
14 other African-American and Latino residents died at the hands of New York police, many
in suspicious circumstances, between January and April 1990 in an atmosphere created by the
drug war. Krajicek, Newest Cop on the Beat, Daily News, Feb. 21, 1990, at 20, col. 1.
143. Since February 1987, serious questions have been raised by at least eight incidents
in which police involved in narcotics operations shot civilians, most of them African-American.
For instance, in February 28, 1987 police assigned to Operation Pressure Point II in Central Harlem shot and killed Nicholas Bartlett, an African-American street vendor and Army
veteran, although some eyewitnesses dispute police claims that Bartlett had, for no reason,
attacked police with a metal pipe. See Purdum, New York Officers Are Cleared In Death of
Vendor, N.Y. Times, May 9, 1987, at 1, col. 1; Morgan, Questions in Death of Harlem Vendor, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1987, at BI, col. 2; McFadden, Man With Lead Pipe Shot Dead
On Harlem Street By 3 Policemen, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1987, at Al, col. 5.
In May 19, 1987, police shot and killed Mark Cullar, an African-American, during a raid
on a Bedford-Stuyvesant crackhouse. Police, who were the only witnesses, claimed that Cullar
had attempted to assault them by holding a knife in his right hand, which from childhood was
missing three fingers. See Purdum, Officer Kills Knife-Wielding Man in Raid on Brooklyn
Crack House, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1987, at B3, col. 1.
On November 21, 1988 a Transit Police officer drew his weapon and wounded an anonymous teenager in a subway station after seeing him and three other youths in a "suspicious
transaction." Police later admit that the victim committed no crime and that no drugs were
found. See Goldman, Officer Shoots Youth Accidentally, Police Say, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21,
1988, at B3, col. 2.
On February 15, 1989, A TNT detective shot and killed Shawn Glenn, another AfricanAmerican man, following a "buy and bust" operation at a Harlem crack house. Police claim
that Glenn attacked the detective in an abandoned building and had attempted to take the
detective's revolver; they admitted, however, that Glenn was not a drug dealer and that no
drugs were found on his body. See Gelman, Cop Kills Man in Harlem Drug Raid, N.Y.
Newsday, Feb. 17, 1989, at 30, col. 1.
On April 12, 1989 police shot and killed William John DeVito in Far Rockaway Queens
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ties in the drug wars, ongoing pressure from superiors to achieve results, the continuing ineffectiveness of street-level narcotics operations, and the NYPD's decision to equip narcotics officers with much
heavier weaponry.""
C.

The Criminalizationof Inner-City Residents

1. Overall Destructive Impact.-

Street-level drug enforcement

has resulted in tens of thousands of New Yorkers being arrested,
prosecuted, convicted and incarcerated because of narcotics offenses.145 Because of the attractiveness of using crack to escape reality and its great profit potential, there has been a particularly high
increase in the number of predicate felons, many of whom are arrested on new drug charges for which they, if convicted, face
mandatory incarceration.146 Criminalization also makes it harder
as he left what police termed a "known drug location." Police claimed that Devito had ignored an order to stop, and seemed to be reaching inside his clothing, and that they found a
small knife near his body. An independent eyewitness claimed that the officer shot without
warning or provocation, and no drugs were found. See Peters & Landa, Cop Is Cleared, But
New Questions Arise, Daily News, Apr. 18, 1989, at 4, col. 3; Peters & Marques, Cop
Cleared In Slaying, Daily News, Apr. 14, 1989, at 5, col. 1.
On April 26, 1989 Anthony Issac died when an undercover officer in a Staten Island "buy
and bust" operation shot him in the chest, neck and back, after he and four other men had
allegedly assaulted the officer. See O'Shaughnessy, Shootings Cop Under Fire, Daily News,
May 4, 1989, at 7, col. 1.
On May 1, 1989 the sergeant who supervised the operation in which Issac was killed fired
his 9mm Glock automatic pistol through a steel-plated door in a public housing project and
wounded Yolanda Newsome, an African-American woman. In neither case were weapons
found on the victims. See Gelman, Narcotics Cop On Sick Leave After Shot Injures Woman,
N.Y. Newsday, May 4, 1989, at 31, col. 1.
On May 31, 1989 Trevor Francis, an African-American, dropped six flights from a building roof in Harlem while being chased by officers assigned to Manhattan North Narcotics
District. Witnesses in an angry crowd could not agree as to whether Francis fell accidentally
or was pushed off the roof by the police. See Clark, Cops Cleared In Fatal Plunge, Daily
News, July 15, 1989, at 8, col. I; Moore & Krajicek, Ward: No Slay Push, Daily News, June
2, 1989, at 23, col. 1; Broussard & Kappstatter, Death Fall Sparks Crowd's Fury, Daily
News, June 1, 1989, at 19, col. 2.
In addition, defendants report that police routinely beat those who are rounded up during
TNT and other drug sweeps, especially when a defendant vigorously protests her innocence or
verbally questions police conduct. These accusations seem particularly believable when they
are made by defendants who appear at arraignment sessions in blood-stained clothing, bearing
lacerations, stitches, and/or bruises indisputably received while in custody. Comments attributed by defendants to police such as "you don't have any rights" are too commonly reported to
be dismissed as baseless.
144. These weapons include 9mm Glock automatic pistols and Colt 9mm submachineguns-weapons with much heavier fire-power than the traditional .38 police special.
See Esposito, Cops to Get Automatic Weapons, N.Y. Newsday, Aug. 30, 1988, at 2, col. 2.
145. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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than it already is for felons to find legitimate work, thereby increasing the likelihood of a new arrest and/or parole or probation violation, and further incarceration. The impact of criminalization clearly
falls disproportionately and overwhelmingly on the minority communities, especially African-Americans. 147 This disparity is not primarily the result of racism on the part of individual officers, district attorneys or judges,-although it is very often a factor-but, rather,
flows from the fact that street-level narcotics enforcement, and the
cost that it brings, is inherently directed at communities which are
most victimized by the combination of oppressive social conditions
and drug prohibition.148
2. IndiscriminateProsecution.- Several features of street-level
drug operations have contributed to the probability that many of
those arrested were not involved in drug sales. One factor is the
NYPD's use of arrest "body counts" reminiscent of the Vietnam
War to measure the success of the highly publicized drug operations.149 Anthony Bouza, a former Minneapolis police chief and onetime high-ranking NYPD official, points out that "pressures to produce 'good cases' have resulted in flaking [planting evidence],
dropsy, perjury, entrapment and framing, by cops anxious to please
demanding superiors."1 50 Members of narcotics units also have a sig147. For example, a study of Manhattan North TNT arrests between November, 1988
and February, 1989 shows that 91.1 percent of those arrested were African-American or Latino. See NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY. TNT REPORT SERIES MANHATTAN
NORTH TNT ARRESTS: NOVEMBER 15, 1988-FEBRUARY 15. 1989 (1989) [hereinafter MANHATTAN NORTH ARREST REPORT]. Similar figures are reported throughout TNT. See generally
CRIMINAL JUST. AGENCY, N.Y. CITY, TNT REPORT SERIES: END-OF-YEAR REPORT (1989).
African-Americans and Latinos make up 95 % of the New York City jail population. CORRECTIONAL ASS'N OF NEW YORK, FACT SHEET (Dec. 1989). State prisons are increasingly composed of minority inmates, who it is estimated, will constitute 90 percent of the prisoners by
the year 2000. PROJECT 2000, supra note 58, at 1.
148. See, e.g., Harris, Blacks Take Brunt of War on Drugs, L.A. Times, Apr. 22, 1990,
at Al, col. I.
149. See VERA INST. REPORT, supra note 14, at 7 (noting that "[t]he NYPD expects
TNT to have high visibility, but a visibility achieved through high arrest volume and community announcements rather than a uniformed presence."); see also GOVERNOR'S JULY ACTION
AGENDA, supra note 27, at 9 (reporting 8,133 TNT city-wide arrests since March 14, 1988).
150. Bouza, supra note 40, at 45-46. In 1987 and 1988 a scandal erupted over similar
practices in the Transit Police Department, where white officers and detectives had met departmental arrest quotas by falsely accusing African-American and Latino men of sexually
abusing white women on the subways. See Neuffer, Arrest Inquiry Widens to 9 Transit Officers, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1987, at B1, col. 2; see also Levine, Moregenthau Won't Charge
Transit Police, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1988, at 29, col. 5; Levine, 2 Transit Officers Are Held
by U.S., N.Y. Times, May 13, 1988, at Al, col. 3, B4, col. 4; Levine, Defense Attacks Arrest
in Transit Police Case, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1988, at B3, col. 5; Uhlig, Transit Police Remove Officer for Quota Plan, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1987, at B7, col. 1; Emery, The Even
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nificant economic incentive to make arrests since each collar can result in as much as $500 in overtime for the arresting officer.' 5 '
The "buy and bust" operations that characterize TNT are particularly responsive to these dynamics. In theory, plainclothes officers
buy narcotics and arrest the sellers. 52 In reality, buy and bust operations often result in indiscriminate arrests 53 and invite attempts to
Sadder New York Police Saga, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1987, at 31, col. 2; Levine, Decoy Unit
Halted by TransitPolice in Arrests Dispute, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1987, at Al, col. 1; Levine,
Four in Inquiry Were Lauded on Arrest Rate, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1987, at 25, col. 4;
Levine, Koch Pledges Inquiry on Arrests by Transit Police, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1987, at
Al, col. 4; Levine & Neuffer, 4 New York Transit Officers in New York Accused of Unlawful
Arrests, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
151. Krajicek, Cops Clean Up On Crime, N.Y. Daily News, Apr. 3, 1989, at 21, col. 1,
col. 3. This might explain why the number of arrests soar in the months immediately prior to
the winter holidays, a phenomena known locally as "extra collars for Christmas dollars." See
also Heilbroner, 'Collarsfor Dollars, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1989, at A27, col. 1.
152. In theory, a "Buy and Bust" begins with the deployment of a team of plainclothes
officers at a drug trafficking location (the "set"). The undercover member of the team
purchases ("makes buys") from dealers, usually with marked currency ("pre-recorded buy
money"). Occasionally the undercover wears a radio transmitter (a "wire") to record and/or
transmit the transaction to the rest of the unit (the "backup team"), which waits just out of
sight. Sometimes another officer (the "ghost") keeps the undercover in visual contact. After
the buy, the undercover transmits a description of the seller to the backup team, which detains
those who match the undercover's radio description. Some time later, the undercover views and
makes a confirmatory identification of the suspect, either at the scene (a "drive-by") or in the
precinct. Where a buy was made from a crack house (a "peep-hole" sale), police secure a
search warrant and conduct a raid. At trial, prosecutors lead experienced police witnesses
through a recitation of the above process in order to impress upon the jury the idea that any
defendant arrested in a "buy and bust" operation must be guilty.
For further discussion of how "Buy and Bust" operations are supposed to be performed,
see People v. Hill, 136 Misc. 2d 670, 671-72, 519 N.Y.S.2d 166, 167-68 (S.Ct. Queens Cty.
1987); ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL BUREAU, N.Y. POLICE DEP'T, INVESTIGATOR'S GUIDE
(1985); NEW YORK POLICE DEP'T, NARCOTICS DIVISION MANUAL OF PROCEDURES Procedure
No. 40 (July 1985); DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. & BUREAU OF OPERATIONS & RES., IN'TL ASS'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, NARCOTICS INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL 99102 (1983);.
153. To remain above suspicion, an undercover police officer must not appear too obviously interested in the seller's appearance. Therefore, the description given to the back up
team is usually general, such as "Black male, tee-shirt, jeans and sneakers." In order to protect the undercover's identity, a drive-by identification at the scene is quick, at a distance and
from a moving vehicle. Precinct identifications are inherently suggestive and unmonitored and
an identification may occur hours after the transaction, during which interval the officer will
have made numerous buys from other sellers. Cf. GOVERNOR'S Nov. ACTION AGENDA, supra
note 56, at 17 (pointing out that district attorneys around the city have dismissed a disproportionately high number of drug felonies within 30 days of arrest-6.2 percent in comparison
with 3.1 percent for other types of felonies in the second quarter of 1989-an action which
demonstrates that there are inherent problems in arrest methods).
For example, in discussing a typical buy and bust operation, one court found that "the
back-up team . . .swept through the block and lined up, against the wall, any male who
happened to be in the vicinity and since the defendant was in the vicinity he too was ordered
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frame drug suspects.1 54 In most cases, these realities are shielded
out of his van." People v. Franklin, N.Y.L.J., May 26, 1989, at 23, col. 4, col. 5 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct., Kings Co.).
154. The undercover's initial transmission to the backup team is rarely recorded at the
time it is received; rather, arresting officers typically write the descriptions of alleged perpetrators on police reports, after a defendant has been arrested and is being processed at the precinct. While it is impossible to know which defendant is truthfully maintaining innocence, and
which is crying wolf, it is indisputable that accusations of a "frame-up" occur with much
greater frequency in narcotics than most other types of cases. In New York City, the main
police reports completed in "buy and bust" operations include the OCCB Buy Report (PD
321-152); Buy Corroboration Report (PD 381-140); Expense Report (PD 102-061); and Investigator's Daily Activity Report (439-156).
This presents the question of whether the arresting officer wrote in the space for "perpetrator" the description of the person who sold the drugs, or only the appearance of whoever
happened to end up cuffed to a chair in front of the desk at the precinct, and whether prerecorded buy money, drugs or other evidence were found on suspects, or merely attributed to
that suspect after they were in police custody? Defendants commonly report that when police
find drugs dropped in the street during a sweep, they inform the first available suspect that
"these are yours." Moreover, since many defendants are arrested without drugs or any other
contraband, many narcotics cases are based solely on an officer's testimony that the apprehended person sold drugs to the undercover officer. In other cases, the arrest is made on the
claim that police witnessed the defendant sell drugs to a civilian buyer, who often remains
"unapprehended."
One highly publicized pre-TNT drug frame arose in 1985, when six African-Americans
arrested in separate incidents charged that they had been torturned with electric shock "stun
guns" and beaten by white officers in the 106th precinct in Queens. The arresting officers
wanted them to falsely admit to selling marijuana to undercover officers. One of the defendants reported that while under torture, he screamed for his mother, to which a white officer
See Fried, Stun-Gun Trial Ends with Four Being Conreplied, "[t]his ain't TV, n-."
victed, Feb. 25, 1988, at B2, col. 6; Fried, Two Queens Officers Convicted in Stun-Gun Trial,
N.Y. Times, May 3, 1986, at 1, col. 4; 6th Man Describes Stun-Gun Assault, N.Y. Times,
May 8, 1985, at B9, col. I; McFadden, No. 3 on Police Force Retiring Amid Torture Case,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1985, at Al, col. 4; Raab, A Second Charge of Torture in Queens
Precinct Is Made, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1985, at B3, col. 5; Raab, Police Sargeant and Officer
Are Charged with Torturing Youth After Arrest, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1985, at BI, col. 1;
McFadden, Youth's Charges of Torture By an Officer Spur Inquiry, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22,
1985, at B3, col. 5.
Such practices are also suggested by the unusually large number of decisions that have
suppressed evidence in drug cases because of what appears to be routine police perjury. See
generally, People v. Lisbon, N.Y.L.J., May 19, 1989, at 23, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Co.);
People v. Girard, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 7, 1989, at 23, col. 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.); People v.
Smith, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 3, 1989, at 25, col. 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Co.); People v. Elliott,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 10, 1989, at 24, col. 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Co.); People v. Britch, N.Y.L.J.,
Jan. 20, 1989, at 23, col. 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Co.); People v. Pryor, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 10,
1988, at 26, col. 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens Co.); People v. Martinez, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 29, 1988,
at 24, col. 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Co.); People v. Gadson, July 11, 1988, at 29, col. 4 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Kings Co.); People v. Stivala, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 12, 1988, at 14, col. 2 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
N.Y. Co.); People v. Rodriguez, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 23, 1987, at 13, col. 3 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Bronx
Co.); People v. Gregg, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 18, 1987, at 27, col. 3 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Queens Co.);
People v. McKnight, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 22, 1987, at 14, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Co.); People
v. Martinez, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 21, 1987, at 53, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens Co.).
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from exposure by the traditional "blue wall of silence," by a dangerous assignment in which officers depend heavily on the team, and
widespread drug-related corruption and drug use in the NYPD. 1"
Perhaps most importantly, police know that the vast majority of
false accusations will never be challenged because the criminal justice process systematically coerces defendants to plead guilty by
threatening to impose the extremely heavy sentence authorized for
felony drug offenses15 if defendants who maintain their innocence
are later convicted. Under intense pressure, the vast majority of drug
defendants-guilty and innocent-capitulate. 57 Although this pro155.. Dismissals of NYPD officers for failing, or refusing to take, the "Dole" drug test
doubled between 1986 and 1988, and officials report the use of drugs by undercover narcotics
officers. N.Y. Newsday, May 13, 1989, at 8, col. 4. Similarly, in 1986, thirteen officers at the
77th precinct in the Bedford-Stuyvesant area of Brooklyn were charged with accepting bribes
from internal affairs investigators posing as dealers, and with selling confiscated cocaine. See
Purdum, Wider Police Corruption Inquiry is Seen, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1989, at B3, col. 1.
Six officers were convicted after trial, and another officer committed suicide. See Daly, The
Crack in the Shield, The Fall of the Seven-Seven, N.Y. MAG., Dec. 8, 1986, at 49-50. Some
officers claimed that the scandal was just the tip of the iceberg. See Purdum, supra, at B3, col.
1; see also M. MCALARY. BUDDY BoYs (1988).

Currently, civilian complaints against officers for alleged drug use, sale, theft and corruption have risen dramatically. For example, seven Housing Police officers detailed to the
NYPD's Organized Crime Control Bureau are alleged to have run a ring which provided police identification cards and parking permits to drug dealers, used confidential Narcotics Division reports to seize and sell caches of cocaine, and served as enforcers for and provided information to an organized crime family. See Tyre, How a Housing Cop Crossed the Line, N.Y.
Newsday, Sept. 19, 1989, at 4, col. 1; see also Tyre, Cop Drug Ring Suspects Fearedto Have
Sold Police ID Forms, N.Y. Newsday, Sept. 9, 1989, at 5, col. 1; Tyre, State Investigating
Leaks to Cop Drug Ring Suspects, N.Y. Newsday, Sept. 8, 1989, at 3, col. 1; Peters &
Krajicek, Police Shakeup, Daily News, Aug. 25, 1989, at 14, col. 1. Ironically, thirty other
officers implicated in the scandal were reassigned to TNT. Tyre, Brass Says They're Scapegoats, N.Y. Newsday, Sept. 9, 1989, at 5, col. 1.
156. For a discussion of sentencing structures, see supra notes 57-58 and accompanying
text. For example, following his 1989 conviction, a Queens court sentenced Gary Veil to 10 20 years in prison for making a $10 crack sale. His prior record consisted of three misdemeanor drug sales. See Ain, 10 Years is Message for $10 Crackseller,Daily News, Apr. 29,
1989, at 6, col. 1. Also in 1989, Fred Boston, a 23-year-old "steerer" (one who directs a buyer
to a seller) received a sentence of 9 - 18 years in Brooklyn as a result of a TNT arrest. See
McCallister, Jailfor Dealer Caught in TNT Net, Daily News, Sept. 7, 1989, at KSI 1, col. 1.
157. Defendants often spend up to four days or more in police custody before reaching
arraignment in Criminal Court and the first brief interview with an attorney. Citing the seriousness of felony drug offenses, and the fact that many drug defendants have prior open cases
or convictions, judges often set bail which defendants cannot raise.
Under New York's Criminal Procedure Law, the jailed defendant will next appear in a
maximum of one hundred and forty-four hours after arrest to learn whether the case will
remain a felony, whether a plea bargain will be offered, whether a grand jury has voted indictment, or whether the case will be dismissed altogether. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 180.80
(McKinney 1989). In recent years, narcotics defendants have made such appearances in the
"N Part," a special branch of Supreme Court, the trial level felony court which is designed to
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cess may work to the advantage of those guilty defendants who lack
the basis with which to fight their case, it also deters defendants
from testing the legality and/or strength of the prosecution's case.1"8
The danger of this process is clearest when a jailed defendant accepts probation and is released pending sentence, while the defendant who maintains innocence remains in custody for an extended period. Under these circumstances, it is a gross mockery for defendants
to admit, as they must in every guilty plea, that they are pleading
guilty because they are guilty. 159
quickly dispose of the tidal wave of drug arrests. See infra note 159 (discussing the quick
disposition of cases in the "N Parts").
Compared with the potentially draconian long-term incarceration which hangs over a felony drug defendant, plea offers made by the prosecution and/or the court in the "N Part" are
of bargain basement proportions. By plea bargaining, defendants charged with "B" felonies
and who have no prior felonies can receive five years probation, sometimes to be preceded by
six months in city jail, in exchange for pleading guilty to a felony. Prior ("predicate") felons
are offered indeterminate sentences in state prison in the area of one-and-a-half to three years
up to three to nine years, depending on the length and seriousness of the defendant's prior
record and the prosecution's perception of the strength or weakness of the new case. See N.Y.
PENAL LAW §§ 70.06 to .10 (McKinney 1989). Those with multiple open cases are offered a
heavier sentence. Id.
158. Thus, even in cases where clients vehemently protest their innocence, even the most
combative defense attorneys must caution clients that a grand jury is likely to indict prior to
the time at which release in the "N Part" would be required; that the chance of winning even
a valid suppression issue, decided by a judge who must determine the credibility of the witnesses and issues of law, are slim; that police witnesses bearing physical evidence will testify at
trial that the defendant is the person who committed the offense charged; and that jurors may
well convict them out of a desire to put a dent in crime and/or other prejudices. These factors
are discussed in a crowded noisy cell, after a week or more without clean clothes, a shower,
sanitary toilets, healthy food, sleep, or in many cases family contact, and with only a few
minutes before the case is called. See Glaberson, Trapped in the Terror of New York's HoldIng Pens, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1990, at Al, col. 2. The system continues to apply this pressure to defendants who move toward trial.
159. Asking a defendant in court whether they are pleading guilty because they are
guilty is intended to elicit an answer to support the voluntariness of a defendant's plea for the
record. For further discussion of the judicial process in New York City drug cases, including
the "N Parts," see, e.g., JUDICIARY 1989, supra note 59, at 19-20; Kurtz, In New York
Courts, Next Drug Plea, Please, Wash. Post, Oct. 8, 1988, Al, col. 3 (stating that almost one
fifth of the defendants in the "N Part" plead guilty); Fried, More Queens Drug Defendants
Are Pleading Guilty, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1988, B8, col. 4 (stating that the "N Part" has
jurisdiction over all felony drug cases during the first six days after arrest and that by concentrating all drug cases into one part, the court accelerates the disposition of many of them);
Kerr, Drug Court Cuts New York Backlog, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1988, at 1, col. 1 (noting that
some defense attorneys believe that their clients are pressured into pleading guilty before the
attorneys can study the cases and before the case goes before the grand jury).
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D. The Effect on Other Services
While "surplus" funds were being diverted to TNT, 160 ordinary
New York residents are making great sacrifices in other government
programs to pay for these enforcement programs. The City implemented $160 million in new taxes as well as a $300 million hiring
freeze and service cuts l" l which resulted in steps such as the eviction
of 200 men from a homeless shelter to make room for an overflow of
female jail inmates.162 Other proposed measures include cuts in the
Fire Department, sanitation, foster care workers, drug treatment for
children, home-care services for those with AIDS, child care, job
training, libraries, schools, parks and recreation. 6 3 The newly installed administration of David N. Dinkins, New York City's first
African-American mayor, has imposed still harsher cuts. 64 Perhaps
most ironically, the state has cut plans for drug treatment, which is
already nearly impossible to find for the poor. 6 5 These measures
make it even more attractive for inner-city young people to use and/
or sell narcotics.
V.

THE LEGALIZATION ALTERNATIVE

Although this Article focusses on New York City, the dynamics
of street level enforcement discussed here are typical of those across
the United States. For this reason, the failure of New York's drug
wars, the reasons for that failure, and the destructive impact of the
war in predominantly African-American and Latino inner-city communities, have national implications.
Above all, the analysis presented here provides strong support
for ending the inner-city drug wars. First, criminalization has had
little, if any, deterrent effect on crack abuse or trafficking, and given
the dynamics of these activities it is extremely unlikely that such
wars will do so. Second, it is the combination of prohibition and oppressive inner-city conditions-rather than crack itself-that is responsible for the deepening vortex of crime, violence and disease that
160. See

GOVERNOR'S Nov. AcTION AGENDA, supra note 56, at 22.
161. See Lubasch, New York Adopts $26.6 Billion Budget, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1989,
at 27, col. 4
162. See Hemphill, Female Inmates, N.Y. Newsday, Apr. 7, 1989, at 6, col. 1.
163. Preston, Koch's Budget Cuts Cut Deficit, N.Y. Newsday, Oct. 25, 1989, at 3, col.
2.
164. See, e.g, Purdum, Dinkins Forecasts Wider Budget Gap As Revenues Slip, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 6, 1990, at Al, col. 4.
165. See, e.g., Sack, Cuomo Plans for Drug Centers in Campus Settings Is Shelved,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
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constitutes the crack crisis. 166 And third, prohibition intensifies the
harm already inflicted on these communities by the criminal justice
system. In other words, prohibition has not only failed to impact on,
but is itself an integral part of, the crack crisis.
For these reasons, it is necessary to explore other solutions,
starting with drug legalization,167 an alternative which has support
among a growing number of African-American leaders. 68 Yet many
who live in communities most heavily affected by the crisis fear that
legalization would send to young people the message that "drugs are
o.k." and thereby result in greater drug abuse. 6 Because of the very
serious consequences which crack has had in these communities, this
apprehension is understandable.
In reality, however, legalization would in all likelihood effectively address most of the manifestations of the current crack crisis.
Distribution of drugs at their actual production cost

70

would elimi-

nate the overwhelming majority of drug-related crime, and dramatically undercut the current explosion of inner-city AIDS, syphilis and
other diseases. Just as repeal of alcohol prohibition dramatically reduced the gangland wars of the 1920's and early 1930's, drug legalization takes the profit out of drug distribution, and thereby brings
about a dramatic reduction in the slaughter which plagues the innercity and at the same time undermines the role model status which
low level drug dealers currently represent to young people. As one
advocate of legalization argued:
166. One feature of the crack crisis that is not as directly related to prohibition is the
growing problem of "crack babies" who are born addicted due to maternal drug use during
pregnancy. See, e.g., Colen, Cocaine Babies, N.Y. Newsday, Mar. 27, 1990, Part II, at 1, col.
1. Unfortunately, however, drug prohibition has not successfully addressed this problem. As
with large numbers of children who are born alcoholic or who suffer birth defects due to the
conduct of pregnant women, and like that problem, must be addressed through means other
than prohibition.
167. The terms "legalization" and "decriminalization" are often used interchangeably.
Many regard decriminalization as a less radical alternative to legalization. For an in-depth
discussion of all aspects of the legalization/decriminalization debate, see supra note 18 (listing
other authors commenting on the debate).
168. See, e.g., Schmoke, An Argument In Favor of Drug Decriminalization, 18 HoFSTRA L. REv. 501 (1990) Walker, Cong. Crockett Endorses Legalized Use of Drugs, Amsterdam News, Dec. 30, 1989, at 47, col. 1.
169. See, e.g., Rangel, Legalize Drugs? Not on Your Life, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1988,
at A25, col. 1, col. 1. Thus, a 1988 poll conducted among New York City residents showed
that support for legalization was less among African-Americans (14%) and Latinos (7%)
than among whites (19%). See Richardson, Poll: Legalizing Drugs Opposed, N.Y. Newsday,
June 26, 1988, at 3, col. 3.
170. There are many different blueprints for just how decriminalization or legalization
would be implemented. See supra note 18 (listing other sources on decriminalization).
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[t]he day after legalization went into effect, the streets of America
would be safer. The drug dealers would be gone. The shootouts
between drug dealers would end. Innocent bystanders would not be
murdered anymore. Hundreds of thousands of drug "addicts"
would no longer be rooming the streets, shoplifting, mugging,
breaking into homes in the middle of the night to steal, and dealing
violently with those who happened to wake up. One year after prohibition was repealed, 825 innocent people who would otherwise
have been dead at the hands of drug criminals would be alive
171

In addition, an end to prohibition would help to "demilitarize" innercity neighborhoods that are currently under siege not only by drug
dealers, but also by the criminal justice system.
Moreover, there are numerous effective ways for combatting
crack abuse under legalization. To begin with, it is necessary to create an unprecedented level of drug education and drug treatment on
demand, neither of which effectively exist under prohibition. In addition, sending a message that drugs such as crack are "not o.k."
would require a ban on the type of advertising that is currently permitted for alcohol and tobacco, whose inherent effects are far more
destructive to human health than is crack."7 2
However, such programs and policies are not, by themselves,
sufficient. While important, drug education will not deter those without hope. As one former addict commented, "[y]ou know how bad
[crack] is, but you still do it.' 1 7 3 Residential drug treatment on demand and a ban on advertising would have limited impact if the lives
by a deeplyof many community residents remain uncharacterized
174
felt oppression and the lack of opportunity.
For these reasons, a solution to widespread drug abuse must ad:
dress the institutional racism and poverty that continues to spawn
such deep hopelessness in this country's inner-cities. Such conditions
have long been imposed on the African-American and Latino community. Even the Civil Rights and Black Power movements of the
1960's were unable to win more than token increases in social spending when compared either with military expenditures or objective
171. Ostrowski, supra note 102, at 685. See also Clarke, Legalizing Drugs-Step. No.
1, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1989, at 23, col. 1.

172. See Ostrowski, supra note 102 at 695-702.
173.

Schmalz, On Battleground of the Street, Few See a Victory Over Drugs, N.Y.

Times, Sept. 7, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
174.

Bacon, Little is Known About Treatments, Wall St. J., Sept. 6, 1989, at Al 1, col.
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need, let alone a fundamental change in the overall power relationships in which these communities exist. Similarly, despite the existence of a potentially large "peace dividend", the vast resources necessary for a meaningful drug treatment policy 7 5 --1et alone broader
change-will not be made available without a fight. The challenge is
for those who seek a genuine solution to drug abuse to free those
resources and reorganize society to remove the cause of the widespread drug abuse that prevails today.

175. Treatment on demand for the estimated six million people in the U.S. who are
addicted to heroin and cocaine will cost as much as $116 billion. Cohen, Helping Addicts Help
Each Other, N.Y. Newsday, Jan. 25, 1989, at 58, col. 1.
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